Lets restate this philosophical problem as a problem of ontology
Imagine that you want to write a computer program that perfectly simulates what’s going on at the quantum level Now the problem comes down to asking how many classes you need to define in your domain model
When you run your program will there be only one class of object instantiated (the wave class) or are there two different types of objects (of wave class and particle class) ?
The many worlds interpretation is equivalent to saying you only need to define one class in your model (wave class) because wave objects are all there are
Other interpretations are equivalent to saying you need to define at least two different classes (waves and particles) since both types of object can be instantiated and you also therefore need to define the interface showing the message passing between the two different types of object as per the rules of object oriented programming
When restating the problem in this way much confusion immediately clears
It should be obvious that the many worlds interpretation has much greater simplicity and clarity and that all other interpretations are in fact a return of dualism in disguise (with all the associated problem thereof).
It is for that reason that many worlds wins hands down.
Just simulating the wave dynamics is not enough. You have to generate some further object from the waves, in order to get something in your simulation with the properties of reality. For example, you can repeatedly apply the Born rule as in Copenhagen to get a single stochastic history of particles, in which events occur with the appropriate frequencies. Or you could specify a deterministic rule for branching and joining, in which worlds are duplicated in different quantities at moments of branching in accordance with the Born rule, to create a deterministic multiverse in which events occur with the appropriate frequencies. Neither approach is very elegant; it’s simpler to suppose that the waves are an incomplete statistical-mechanical description of something more fundamental (which, because of Bell’s theorem, can’t be a locally deterministic system in any obvious way, though it might be a local determinism whose variables are then transformed nonlocally to give conventional space-time).
But MWI advocates (at least of the Oxford variety) claim that the properties of reality emerge from the wavefunction. No additional “beables” are required. I know you disagree, but I’m pretty sure that’s the sort of view Aaronson is referring to when he says MWI is mathematically simpler. The fundamental ontology is the wavefunction itself, not worlds of matter/energy whose multiplication is described by the wavefunction.
I certainly don’t think Scott belongs to the Oxford school. He’s probably just one of those people for whom the existence of probability-like numbers in the density matrix is enough. (The flaw of this perspective is that you need these numbers to appear in your ontology as the relative frequencies of something, because that’s what they are in reality.)
I was quite certain that Wallace et al (Oxfordians) dismissed pure WF realism in favour of state space realism when attempting to make it relativistic?
But obviously reality is not about non-relativistic quantum mechanics. So whenever a discussion about interpretations is brought up, I think it is dishonest to argue FOR a partial version of it that really has nothing to do with reality
Fair enough. Unfortunately, the interpretive options for QFT are still not clearly worked out. I think the idea among quantum foundations people tends to be that we first figure out the best interpretation in the relatively simpler domain of NRQM, then think about how to adapt this interpretation to meet any new challenges from QFT.
This is no doubt partly due to the fact that the formal structure of NRQM is much better systematized and understood. We basically have a satisfactory axiomatization of NRQM, but attemptedaxiomatizations of QFT still have many lacunae. So there’s definitely a “looking for your keys under the streetlight even though you dropped them in the dark” thing going on here.
By all means! The Relativity complicates this MWI. We have different splits for different observers, since everything is not simultaneous for everyone.
Now what, if the future velocity of an observer is a result of a quantum experiment’s outcome. What’s very often, if not always!
MWI, the non-relativistic version is NOT real, anyway.
Lets restate this philosophical problem as a problem of ontology
Imagine that you want to write a computer program that perfectly simulates what’s going on at the quantum level
Now the problem comes down to asking how many classes you need to define in your domain model
When you run your program will there be only one class of object instantiated (the wave class) or are there two different types of objects (of wave class and particle class) ?
The many worlds interpretation is equivalent to saying you only need to define one class in your model (wave class) because wave objects are all there are
Other interpretations are equivalent to saying you need to define at least two different classes (waves and particles) since both types of object can be instantiated and you also therefore need to define the interface showing the message passing between the two different types of object as per the rules of object oriented programming
When restating the problem in this way much confusion immediately clears
It should be obvious that the many worlds interpretation has much greater simplicity and clarity and that all other interpretations are in fact a return of dualism in disguise (with all the associated problem thereof). It is for that reason that many worlds wins hands down.
Just simulating the wave dynamics is not enough. You have to generate some further object from the waves, in order to get something in your simulation with the properties of reality. For example, you can repeatedly apply the Born rule as in Copenhagen to get a single stochastic history of particles, in which events occur with the appropriate frequencies. Or you could specify a deterministic rule for branching and joining, in which worlds are duplicated in different quantities at moments of branching in accordance with the Born rule, to create a deterministic multiverse in which events occur with the appropriate frequencies. Neither approach is very elegant; it’s simpler to suppose that the waves are an incomplete statistical-mechanical description of something more fundamental (which, because of Bell’s theorem, can’t be a locally deterministic system in any obvious way, though it might be a local determinism whose variables are then transformed nonlocally to give conventional space-time).
But MWI advocates (at least of the Oxford variety) claim that the properties of reality emerge from the wavefunction. No additional “beables” are required. I know you disagree, but I’m pretty sure that’s the sort of view Aaronson is referring to when he says MWI is mathematically simpler. The fundamental ontology is the wavefunction itself, not worlds of matter/energy whose multiplication is described by the wavefunction.
I certainly don’t think Scott belongs to the Oxford school. He’s probably just one of those people for whom the existence of probability-like numbers in the density matrix is enough. (The flaw of this perspective is that you need these numbers to appear in your ontology as the relative frequencies of something, because that’s what they are in reality.)
I was quite certain that Wallace et al (Oxfordians) dismissed pure WF realism in favour of state space realism when attempting to make it relativistic?
I’m assuming this whole conversation is about non-relativistic quantum mechanics.
But obviously reality is not about non-relativistic quantum mechanics. So whenever a discussion about interpretations is brought up, I think it is dishonest to argue FOR a partial version of it that really has nothing to do with reality
Fair enough. Unfortunately, the interpretive options for QFT are still not clearly worked out. I think the idea among quantum foundations people tends to be that we first figure out the best interpretation in the relatively simpler domain of NRQM, then think about how to adapt this interpretation to meet any new challenges from QFT.
This is no doubt partly due to the fact that the formal structure of NRQM is much better systematized and understood. We basically have a satisfactory axiomatization of NRQM, but attempted axiomatizations of QFT still have many lacunae. So there’s definitely a “looking for your keys under the streetlight even though you dropped them in the dark” thing going on here.
By all means! The Relativity complicates this MWI. We have different splits for different observers, since everything is not simultaneous for everyone.
Now what, if the future velocity of an observer is a result of a quantum experiment’s outcome. What’s very often, if not always!
MWI, the non-relativistic version is NOT real, anyway.