It sounds like you are saying that he was making claims about 2.
No, I think he was also wrong about the Bank of Japan’s relative competence. I didn’t argue this next point directly in the post because it would have been harder to argue than the other points I made, but I think Eliezer is just straight up wrong that the Bank of Japan was pursuing a policy prior to 2013 that made Japan forgo trillions of dollars in lost economic growth.
To be clear, I don’t think that the Bank of Japan was following the optimal monetary policy by any means, and I currently think Scott Sumner is right to think they should have printed more money. But Eliezer didn’t just say that the Bank of Japan could switch to a slightly better policy on the margin. He repeated multiple times that it was a major policy failure, that cost trillions of dollars in real value to Japan, and even went on to repeat that claim but in the context of Europe. In my opinion that’s a major difference. I think he’s simply wrong about the cost of the policy, even if he was right about which blogger has the correct theory.
It would still just be illustrative, not strong evidence. And as something that is merely illustrative, if it turned out to be wrong it wouldn’t be reason to change one’s mind about the original claim.
It matters what examples you use to illustrate an argument. Presumably Eliezer tried to remember times in his life in which he was able to know better than a bunch of experts, and this example came to mind as especially salient (hence why he used it as his first example). The fact that he turned out to be mistaken about the example provides significant evidence about how often he’s able to know better than experts about their domain of expertise.
Hm, I think I’m still confused about what thesis you’re pointing to and where, if anywhere, you and I disagree. I think we agree:
That you should be more hesitant to disagree in places where the incentives are strong for others to get things right (like stocks).
That you should be more hesitant to disagree with people who seem smart.
That you should be more hesitant to disagree about topics you are less knowledgeable about.
That you should be more hesitant to disagree about topics that are complex.
That the above is not an exhaustive list of things to consider when thinking about how hesitant you should be to disagree. There’s a lot more to it.
I think Eliezer as well as most reasonable people would agree with the above as well. The difficulty comes when you starting considering a specific example and getting concrete. How smart do we think the people who run the Bank of Japan are? Are they incentivized to do what is best for the country or are other incentives driving their policy? How complex is the topic?
For the Bank of Japan example, it sounds like you (as well as most others) think that Eliezer was too confident. Personally I am pretty agnostic about that point and don’t have much of an opinion.
I just don’t see why it matters. Regardless of whether Eliezer himself is prone to being overconfident, points 1 through 5 still stand, right? Or do you think one/part of Eliezer’s thesis goes beyond them?
No, I think he was also wrong about the Bank of Japan’s relative competence. I didn’t argue this next point directly in the post because it would have been harder to argue than the other points I made, but I think Eliezer is just straight up wrong that the Bank of Japan was pursuing a policy prior to 2013 that made Japan forgo trillions of dollars in lost economic growth.
To be clear, I don’t think that the Bank of Japan was following the optimal monetary policy by any means, and I currently think Scott Sumner is right to think they should have printed more money. But Eliezer didn’t just say that the Bank of Japan could switch to a slightly better policy on the margin. He repeated multiple times that it was a major policy failure, that cost trillions of dollars in real value to Japan, and even went on to repeat that claim but in the context of Europe. In my opinion that’s a major difference. I think he’s simply wrong about the cost of the policy, even if he was right about which blogger has the correct theory.
It matters what examples you use to illustrate an argument. Presumably Eliezer tried to remember times in his life in which he was able to know better than a bunch of experts, and this example came to mind as especially salient (hence why he used it as his first example). The fact that he turned out to be mistaken about the example provides significant evidence about how often he’s able to know better than experts about their domain of expertise.
Hm, I think I’m still confused about what thesis you’re pointing to and where, if anywhere, you and I disagree. I think we agree:
That you should be more hesitant to disagree in places where the incentives are strong for others to get things right (like stocks).
That you should be more hesitant to disagree with people who seem smart.
That you should be more hesitant to disagree about topics you are less knowledgeable about.
That you should be more hesitant to disagree about topics that are complex.
That the above is not an exhaustive list of things to consider when thinking about how hesitant you should be to disagree. There’s a lot more to it.
I think Eliezer as well as most reasonable people would agree with the above as well. The difficulty comes when you starting considering a specific example and getting concrete. How smart do we think the people who run the Bank of Japan are? Are they incentivized to do what is best for the country or are other incentives driving their policy? How complex is the topic?
For the Bank of Japan example, it sounds like you (as well as most others) think that Eliezer was too confident. Personally I am pretty agnostic about that point and don’t have much of an opinion.
I just don’t see why it matters. Regardless of whether Eliezer himself is prone to being overconfident, points 1 through 5 still stand, right? Or do you think one/part of Eliezer’s thesis goes beyond them?