If you are a superscientist, there is nothing you can learn from running a programme that you cannot get from >examining the code.
If you believe this, then you must similarly think that Mary will learn nothing about the qualia associated with colors if she already understands everything about the physics underlying them.
In case I haven’t driven the point home with enough clarity (for example, I did read the link the first time you posted it), I am claiming that there is something to experiencing the program/novel/world inasmuch as there is something to experiencing colors in the world. Whether that something is a subset of the code/words/physics or something additional is the whole point of the problem of qualia.
And no, I don’t have a clear idea what a satisfying answer might look like.
If you believe this, then you must similarly think that Mary will learn nothing about the qualia associated with colors if she already understands everything about the physics underlying them.
That doesn’t follow. Figuring out the behaviour of a programme is just an exercise in logical deduction. It can be done by non-superscientists in easy cases, so it is just an extension of the same idea that a supersceintist can handle difficult cases. However, there is no “easy case” of deducing a perceived quality from objective inormation.
Beyond that, if all you are saying is that the problem of colours is part of a larger problem of qualia, which
itself is part of a larger issue of experience, I can answer with a wholehearted “maybe”. That might make colour
seem less exceptional and therefore less annihilaion-worthy, but I otherwise don’t see where you are going.
I’m not just talking about behavior. The kinds of things involved in experiencing a program involve subjective qualities, like whether Counter-Strike is more fun than Day of Defeat, which maybe can’t be learned just from reading the code.
It’s possible the analogy is actually flawed, and one is contained in its underlying components while the other is not, but I don’t understand how they differ if they do, or why they should.
If you believe this, then you must similarly think that Mary will learn nothing about the qualia associated with colors if she already understands everything about the physics underlying them.
In case I haven’t driven the point home with enough clarity (for example, I did read the link the first time you posted it), I am claiming that there is something to experiencing the program/novel/world inasmuch as there is something to experiencing colors in the world. Whether that something is a subset of the code/words/physics or something additional is the whole point of the problem of qualia.
And no, I don’t have a clear idea what a satisfying answer might look like.
That doesn’t follow. Figuring out the behaviour of a programme is just an exercise in logical deduction. It can be done by non-superscientists in easy cases, so it is just an extension of the same idea that a supersceintist can handle difficult cases. However, there is no “easy case” of deducing a perceived quality from objective inormation.
Beyond that, if all you are saying is that the problem of colours is part of a larger problem of qualia, which itself is part of a larger issue of experience, I can answer with a wholehearted “maybe”. That might make colour seem less exceptional and therefore less annihilaion-worthy, but I otherwise don’t see where you are going.
I’m not just talking about behavior. The kinds of things involved in experiencing a program involve subjective qualities, like whether Counter-Strike is more fun than Day of Defeat, which maybe can’t be learned just from reading the code.
It’s possible the analogy is actually flawed, and one is contained in its underlying components while the other is not, but I don’t understand how they differ if they do, or why they should.