Yes: algorithms are entirely predictable from, and understandable in terms of, their physical realisations.
Now I’m confused: what you just said is a description of a ‘supervenient’ relation. Are you saying that anytime X is said to supervene on Y, we should reject the theory which features X’s?
No. Supervence is an ontologically neutral relationship. In Chalmer’s theory, qualia supervene on brain states,
so novel brain states will lead to novvel qualia. In identity theory, qualia superven on brain states, so ditto. So
the Novel Qualia test does not distinguish the one from the other. The argument for qualia being non-physical
properties, as opposed to algorithms, is down to their redubility, or lack thereof, not supervenience.
Now I’m confused: what you just said is a description of a ‘supervenient’ relation. Are you saying that anytime X is said to supervene on Y, we should reject the theory which features X’s?
No. Supervence is an ontologically neutral relationship. In Chalmer’s theory, qualia supervene on brain states, so novel brain states will lead to novvel qualia. In identity theory, qualia superven on brain states, so ditto. So the Novel Qualia test does not distinguish the one from the other. The argument for qualia being non-physical properties, as opposed to algorithms, is down to their redubility, or lack thereof, not supervenience.