The simplest explanation for the universe is that it doesn’t exist. It’s not popular, because the universe seems to exist. Explanations need to be adequate to the facts, not just simple… Since the inexpressibility of qualia can be accounted for given facts about the limited bandwidth of speech, it does not need to be accounted for all over again on the hypothesis that qualia don’t exist.
But can the inexpressibility of qualia be accounted for by such facts as mentioned? That’s the question, since the claim here is that the only supposed fact you have to support your belief that you experience qualia is your inability to doubt that you do. It’s hard to see how that’s a good reason.
Your claim to account for the ineffability of qualia based on expressive limitations is no different. No facts can tell you whether articulating qualia would exceed our expressive limitations because we have no measure of the expressive demands of a quale. The most you can say is that potential explanations might be available based on expressive limitations, despite our currently having no idea how to apply this concept to “experience.”
Whereas the argument for matter is...?
Science. Human practice. Surely not “I just can’t help believing that matter exists.”
But can the inexpressibility of qualia be accounted for by such facts as mentioned?
It would be more intesting to put forward a specific objection.
the claim here is that the only supposed fact you have to support your belief that you experience qualia is your inability to doubt that you do. It’s hard to see how that’s a good reason.
I don’t think that anything anywhere is better supported. Can you prove the existence of matter, or the falsity of contradictions without assuming them?
No facts can tell you whether articulating qualia would exceed our expressive limitations because we have no measure of the expressive demands of a quale.
What an odd thing to say. The argument for the inexpressability of qualia is just the persistent inability of anyone
to do so—like the argument against the existence of time machines. An explanation for that inablity
is what I gave, just as their are speculative theories against time travel.
Science. Human practice. Surely not “I just can’t help believing that matter exists.”
I think that if you unpack “science” and “human practice” you will find elements of “we assume without proving”..and “we can’t help but believe”.
But can the inexpressibility of qualia be accounted for by such facts as mentioned? That’s the question, since the claim here is that the only supposed fact you have to support your belief that you experience qualia is your inability to doubt that you do. It’s hard to see how that’s a good reason.
Your claim to account for the ineffability of qualia based on expressive limitations is no different. No facts can tell you whether articulating qualia would exceed our expressive limitations because we have no measure of the expressive demands of a quale. The most you can say is that potential explanations might be available based on expressive limitations, despite our currently having no idea how to apply this concept to “experience.”
Science. Human practice. Surely not “I just can’t help believing that matter exists.”
It would be more intesting to put forward a specific objection.
I don’t think that anything anywhere is better supported. Can you prove the existence of matter, or the falsity of contradictions without assuming them?
What an odd thing to say. The argument for the inexpressability of qualia is just the persistent inability of anyone to do so—like the argument against the existence of time machines. An explanation for that inablity is what I gave, just as their are speculative theories against time travel.
I think that if you unpack “science” and “human practice” you will find elements of “we assume without proving”..and “we can’t help but believe”.