In addition, this hypothesis is definitely testable. I made a claim above. Create a new sensory input / type of stimuli, and we will perceive a “new” qualia that was never perceived before, just like colorblind people that have never seen color and don’t have any idea what you’re talking about who would suddenly be able to see colors.
There have been cases of people blind from birth who, by some medical treatment were enabled to see. No references to hand, but Oliver Sacks probably writes about this somewhere. They clearly get new qualia, which are moreover clearly different from those who were sighted from birth.
I thought to use this too, but I was once or twice given the argument that blind people who are made to see are only “accessing” a Given-By-External-Power-To-Humans-At-Birth qualia from outside reality—the argument Eliezer tried to take down in the metaethics sequence about morality being “a light shining from outside” that humans just happen to find and match, applied to qualia. It’s a very good stopsign and/or FGC, apparently.
Because of this, I looked for a more definitive test that these philosophies—those that would discard “creating” sight as a valid new qualia—do not predict (and arguably, cannot, in terms of probability mass, if they want to remain coherent).
I thought to use this too, but I was once or twice given the argument that blind people who are made to see are only “accessing” a Given-By-External-Power-To-Humans-At-Birth qualia from outside reality
Surely that argument is refuted by the fact that the newly sighted do not receive the same qualia as the always-sighted? Instead, they get pretty much the experiences you might predict given what we know about the importance of early experience for the developing faculties: confusion overcome only imperfectly and with difficulty, and with assistance from their more developed senses.
The idea that they received something at birth that they have difficulty accessing has the same problem as the idea that the brain is merely a physical interface through which the soul interacts with the world: all the data are just as consistent with the simpler hypothesis that the brain is the whole story. (That includes the data that there are experiences, which is a difficulty for both materialism, and materialism with the magic word “soul” added.)
Surely that argument is refuted by the fact that the newly sighted do not receive the same qualia as the always-sighted?
Yes, it is, when you accept the evidence you’ve given as valid and can weight arguments based on their probability logic. Denial mechanisms in place will usually prevent proponents of the argument from recognizing the refutation as a valid one. Lots of difficult argumentation and untangling of webs of rationalizations ensues (and arguing by the Occam’s Razor route is even less practical, because in their model, their hypotheses of soul or outer-light or what-have-you is simpler when other parts of their model of the whole world are taken into account, which means even more knots to untangle).
I seek to circumvent that debate entirely by putting the burden of proof on my own “side”, for several reasons, some of which are tinted a slight shade of gray closer to the Dark Arts than I would like.
(That includes the data that there are experiences, which is a difficulty for both materialism, and materialism with the magic word “soul” added.)
I dont’t think this is correct. The phenomenology of subjective exprience suggests that such experiences should be “simple” in a sense—sort of like a bundle of tiny little XML tags attached to the brain. Of course, this is not to argue that our brain parts literally have tiny little XML tags attached to them, any more than other complex objects do. But it does suggest that they might be causally connected to some other, physically simpler phenomena.
There have been cases of people blind from birth who, by some medical treatment were enabled to see. No references to hand, but Oliver Sacks probably writes about this somewhere. They clearly get new qualia, which are moreover clearly different from those who were sighted from birth.
ETA: Wikipedia article on recovery from blindness.
I thought to use this too, but I was once or twice given the argument that blind people who are made to see are only “accessing” a Given-By-External-Power-To-Humans-At-Birth qualia from outside reality—the argument Eliezer tried to take down in the metaethics sequence about morality being “a light shining from outside” that humans just happen to find and match, applied to qualia. It’s a very good stopsign and/or FGC, apparently.
Because of this, I looked for a more definitive test that these philosophies—those that would discard “creating” sight as a valid new qualia—do not predict (and arguably, cannot, in terms of probability mass, if they want to remain coherent).
Surely that argument is refuted by the fact that the newly sighted do not receive the same qualia as the always-sighted? Instead, they get pretty much the experiences you might predict given what we know about the importance of early experience for the developing faculties: confusion overcome only imperfectly and with difficulty, and with assistance from their more developed senses.
The idea that they received something at birth that they have difficulty accessing has the same problem as the idea that the brain is merely a physical interface through which the soul interacts with the world: all the data are just as consistent with the simpler hypothesis that the brain is the whole story. (That includes the data that there are experiences, which is a difficulty for both materialism, and materialism with the magic word “soul” added.)
Yes, it is, when you accept the evidence you’ve given as valid and can weight arguments based on their probability logic. Denial mechanisms in place will usually prevent proponents of the argument from recognizing the refutation as a valid one. Lots of difficult argumentation and untangling of webs of rationalizations ensues (and arguing by the Occam’s Razor route is even less practical, because in their model, their hypotheses of soul or outer-light or what-have-you is simpler when other parts of their model of the whole world are taken into account, which means even more knots to untangle).
I seek to circumvent that debate entirely by putting the burden of proof on my own “side”, for several reasons, some of which are tinted a slight shade of gray closer to the Dark Arts than I would like.
I dont’t think this is correct. The phenomenology of subjective exprience suggests that such experiences should be “simple” in a sense—sort of like a bundle of tiny little XML tags attached to the brain. Of course, this is not to argue that our brain parts literally have tiny little XML tags attached to them, any more than other complex objects do. But it does suggest that they might be causally connected to some other, physically simpler phenomena.