That isn’t a test of reductionism, etc, since many of the alternatives make the same prediction. For instance, David Chalmer’s theory that qualia are non-physical properties that supervene on the physical properties of the brain.
True, it isn’t a particularly specific test that supports all the common views of most LW users. That is not its intended purpose.
The purpose is to establish that “qualia” are not ontologically basic building blocks of the universe sprung into existence alongside up-quarks and charmings for the express purpose of allowing some specific subset of possible complex causal systems to have more stuff that sets them apart from other complex causal systems, just because the former are able to causally build abstract model of parts of their own system and would have internal causal patterns abstractly modeled as “negative reinforcement” that they causally attempt to avoid being fired if these aforementioned “qualia” building blocks didn’t set them apart from the latter kind of complex systems...
… but I guess it does sound kind of obviously silly when you phrase it from a reductionist perspective.
The purpose is to establish that “qualia” are not ontologically basic building blocks of the universe sprung into existence alongside up-quarks and charmings for the express purpose of allowing some specific subset of possible complex causal systems to have more stuff that sets them apart from other complex causal systems,
But it doesn’t. It just establishes that if they, they covary with physical states in the way that would be expected
from identity theory. Admitedly it seems redundant to have a non physical extra ingredient that nonetheless
just shadows what brains are doing physicallly. I think that’s a flaw in Chalmers’ theory. But its conceptual,
not empirical.
“It just establishes that if they exist, they covary with physical states in the way that would be expected from identity theory.”
But thats not the whole problem. It establishes they covary with physical states in the way that would be expected from identity theory, and Chalmerserian dualism, and a bunch of other theories (but maybe not
Cartesian dualism).
Tests need to distinguish between theories, and yours doesn’t.
The purpose is to establish that “qualia” are not ontologically basic building blocks of the universe sprung into existence alongside up-quarks and charmings
Since qualia describe an event (in a sense), I think that if they’re ever found to have measurable existence, they’ll not be so much what a gluon is to “top-quark”, but more something like what division is to the real numbers...
That is exactly—if I interpret your comment charitably—what my hypothesis concludes and what I want to test with the proposed experiment in the grand-grand-parent.
True, it isn’t a particularly specific test that supports all the common views of most LW users. That is not its intended purpose.
The purpose is to establish that “qualia” are not ontologically basic building blocks of the universe sprung into existence alongside up-quarks and charmings for the express purpose of allowing some specific subset of possible complex causal systems to have more stuff that sets them apart from other complex causal systems, just because the former are able to causally build abstract model of parts of their own system and would have internal causal patterns abstractly modeled as “negative reinforcement” that they causally attempt to avoid being fired if these aforementioned “qualia” building blocks didn’t set them apart from the latter kind of complex systems...
… but I guess it does sound kind of obviously silly when you phrase it from a reductionist perspective.
But it doesn’t. It just establishes that if they, they covary with physical states in the way that would be expected from identity theory. Admitedly it seems redundant to have a non physical extra ingredient that nonetheless just shadows what brains are doing physicallly. I think that’s a flaw in Chalmers’ theory. But its conceptual, not empirical.
I… err… what? My mastery of the English language is insufficient to compute the meaning of the I-assume-is-a sentence above.
I meant
“It just establishes that if they exist, they covary with physical states in the way that would be expected from identity theory.”
But thats not the whole problem. It establishes they covary with physical states in the way that would be expected from identity theory, and Chalmerserian dualism, and a bunch of other theories (but maybe not Cartesian dualism).
Tests need to distinguish between theories, and yours doesn’t.
Hmm. I thought it did. I guess I need to review a few things.
Since qualia describe an event (in a sense), I think that if they’re ever found to have measurable existence, they’ll not be so much what a gluon is to “top-quark”, but more something like what division is to the real numbers...
That is exactly—if I interpret your comment charitably—what my hypothesis concludes and what I want to test with the proposed experiment in the grand-grand-parent.