I am happy you posted it here. It sounds reasonable, and from my perspective it doesn’t feel mindkilling.
I have already assumed that state power is about taking resources (or defending from having more taken from you; but if you have the power to achieve that, most people won’t stop there). Saying that the right and the left are two different strategies of creating coalitions to achieve this goal, that sounds quite impartial to me. Maybe I have mentally edited out something offensive, dunno. But I like the definitions of “the Schelling point of power” and “the natural opposition to the former” (this is how I abbreviate it for myself). Definitely more useful than “the guys who would hypothetically sit on the left/right chair in the 18-th century French parliament” or “it’s just completely random coalitions”.
Two things I would like to add:
1) This model seems to work for e.g. USA, but the situation e.g. in post-communist Eastern Europe is the other way round. The Schelling point of power is “let’s bring back communism”, its natural leaders being the former apparatchiks and secret service officers (many of them, or their sons, still active in current army and police). Yet, this is considered “left-wing”. And “right-wing” is the hodgepodge of free market and religious fundamentalism and whoever’s vision of the future does not include the return of communism.
More abstractly, the Schelling point of power depends on the recent historical events in given country. If the previous military power self-identified as “left-wing”, the naming gets reverted.
2) It seems possible to go at least one level deeper in this analysis. You have the “natural Schelling point”, and “its natural opposition” defined as people most likely to be oppressed by the former. But even the opposition oppresses someone—there are “minorities within minorities”—and thus we can sometimes get a second-order opposition, which may ally itself with the enemy of their enemy, despite not belonging there “naturally”. Generally, “enemy of my enemy” strategy can create weird coalitions.
To give a real-life example from American politics, the left-wing coalition includes feminists, gays, and ethnic minorities. But what if you are an ethnic minority member who criticizes how given minority treats their own women or gays? You will get labeled as “right-wing”. Even if you identify as left-wing, and your opinions and arguments are traditionally left-wing, picking the wrong target gets you thrown out of the coalition.
I think you’re right about the Warsaw Pact vs NATO arrangements. Explicitly organizing the state around central economic planning altered the power arrangement so the info-processing bureaucracy (including secret police) ends up being the central coordinating point.
I agree the second-order effects you mention are there, and maybe important to model that so as to not get confused by it, but I don’t think it has done very much so far except occasionally confuse people.
Maybe I have mentally edited out something offensive
I think the potential problem is that many participants in the discussion will strongly identify with one of the two factions I’m describing, so that what appears to be intellectual engagement might just be rooting for one’s team, and arguments are more likely to be soldiers than usual. (I ended up deleting a comment on the North Korea post for this reason.)
I am happy you posted it here. It sounds reasonable, and from my perspective it doesn’t feel mindkilling.
I have already assumed that state power is about taking resources (or defending from having more taken from you; but if you have the power to achieve that, most people won’t stop there). Saying that the right and the left are two different strategies of creating coalitions to achieve this goal, that sounds quite impartial to me. Maybe I have mentally edited out something offensive, dunno. But I like the definitions of “the Schelling point of power” and “the natural opposition to the former” (this is how I abbreviate it for myself). Definitely more useful than “the guys who would hypothetically sit on the left/right chair in the 18-th century French parliament” or “it’s just completely random coalitions”.
Two things I would like to add:
1) This model seems to work for e.g. USA, but the situation e.g. in post-communist Eastern Europe is the other way round. The Schelling point of power is “let’s bring back communism”, its natural leaders being the former apparatchiks and secret service officers (many of them, or their sons, still active in current army and police). Yet, this is considered “left-wing”. And “right-wing” is the hodgepodge of free market and religious fundamentalism and whoever’s vision of the future does not include the return of communism.
More abstractly, the Schelling point of power depends on the recent historical events in given country. If the previous military power self-identified as “left-wing”, the naming gets reverted.
2) It seems possible to go at least one level deeper in this analysis. You have the “natural Schelling point”, and “its natural opposition” defined as people most likely to be oppressed by the former. But even the opposition oppresses someone—there are “minorities within minorities”—and thus we can sometimes get a second-order opposition, which may ally itself with the enemy of their enemy, despite not belonging there “naturally”. Generally, “enemy of my enemy” strategy can create weird coalitions.
To give a real-life example from American politics, the left-wing coalition includes feminists, gays, and ethnic minorities. But what if you are an ethnic minority member who criticizes how given minority treats their own women or gays? You will get labeled as “right-wing”. Even if you identify as left-wing, and your opinions and arguments are traditionally left-wing, picking the wrong target gets you thrown out of the coalition.
I think you’re right about the Warsaw Pact vs NATO arrangements. Explicitly organizing the state around central economic planning altered the power arrangement so the info-processing bureaucracy (including secret police) ends up being the central coordinating point.
I agree the second-order effects you mention are there, and maybe important to model that so as to not get confused by it, but I don’t think it has done very much so far except occasionally confuse people.
I think the potential problem is that many participants in the discussion will strongly identify with one of the two factions I’m describing, so that what appears to be intellectual engagement might just be rooting for one’s team, and arguments are more likely to be soldiers than usual. (I ended up deleting a comment on the North Korea post for this reason.)