The voting system is set up to avoid these edge effects. From the opening post:
(Actually, we use an extra trick here: we imagine that the delegates act as if the Parliament’s decision were a stochastic variable such that the probability of the Parliament taking action A is proportional to the fraction of votes for A. This has the effect of eliminating the artificial 50% threshold that otherwise gives a majority bloc absolute power. Yet – unbeknownst to the delegates – the Parliament always takes whatever action got the most votes: this way we avoid paying the cost of the randomization!)
Hm, somehow I failed to notice that. It’s not clear to me that you want to avoid the edge effects, though; delegates might trade away influence on contentious issues (where we have significant moral uncertainty) to double down on settled issues (where we have insignificant moral uncertainty), if the settled issues are sufficiently important. Eliezer’s concern that delegates could threaten to vote ‘no’ on something important would make others desperately buy their votes away from them- unless you have a nonlinearity which makes the delegates secure that a lone filibuster won’t cause trouble.
[edit]On second thought, though, it seems likely to be desirable that delegates / the parliament would behave linearly in the probability of various moral theories. The concern is mostly that this means we’ll end up doing averaging, and nothing much more interesting.
The voting system is set up to avoid these edge effects. From the opening post:
Hm, somehow I failed to notice that. It’s not clear to me that you want to avoid the edge effects, though; delegates might trade away influence on contentious issues (where we have significant moral uncertainty) to double down on settled issues (where we have insignificant moral uncertainty), if the settled issues are sufficiently important. Eliezer’s concern that delegates could threaten to vote ‘no’ on something important would make others desperately buy their votes away from them- unless you have a nonlinearity which makes the delegates secure that a lone filibuster won’t cause trouble.
[edit]On second thought, though, it seems likely to be desirable that delegates / the parliament would behave linearly in the probability of various moral theories. The concern is mostly that this means we’ll end up doing averaging, and nothing much more interesting.