At least Robert Ettinger seemed to think uploading is nonsense because atoms
At least uploading actually does use different atoms. They are still made of the same nucleons, though. A more reasonable complaint would be that it’s nonsense because neurons/chips.
Is this an actual argument that people who take cryonics seriously seem to be making regularly though? Sounds like something like Searle’s stance, but my unfounded initial assumption is that the crowd that takes Searle seriously and the crowd that takes cryonics seriously don’t overlap much.
Is this an actual argument that people who take cryonics seriously seem to be making regularly though?
It’s common enough that if you go to one of the Reddit pages for Hanson’s post, you’ll find someone objecting to plastination over cryonics on the grounds that uploads are about all that one can do with such a brain. Well, yes.
I’ll admit, I personally find the anti-upload area in cryonics to be absurd—seriously, you’re into cryonics, whose entire rationale is information-theoretic, and you’re objecting to uploads? But I have no hard statistics on, say, how many signed up Alcor or CI members are anti-uploading besides Ettinger.
you’re into cryonics, whose entire rationale is information-theoretic
I don’t think this is the case. Self-identification with your own body can be a strong part of this. I for example personally have a deep emotional connection to my body to the point where I’m much more inclined to do something that has a chance of keeping my brain intact in roughly the same form than an uploaded scan.
Was asking about DanielLC’s alternative “neurons/chips” argument, though I’m still not quite sure what its exact content is. Most of the anti-uploading arguments I’ve seen look like they’re either explicitly or implicitly on the “different atoms” grounds. Don’t recall many that argue for a fundamental unworkability based on some more sophisticated isomorphism failure.
At least uploading actually does use different atoms. They are still made of the same nucleons, though. A more reasonable complaint would be that it’s nonsense because neurons/chips.
Is this an actual argument that people who take cryonics seriously seem to be making regularly though? Sounds like something like Searle’s stance, but my unfounded initial assumption is that the crowd that takes Searle seriously and the crowd that takes cryonics seriously don’t overlap much.
It’s common enough that if you go to one of the Reddit pages for Hanson’s post, you’ll find someone objecting to plastination over cryonics on the grounds that uploads are about all that one can do with such a brain. Well, yes.
I’ll admit, I personally find the anti-upload area in cryonics to be absurd—seriously, you’re into cryonics, whose entire rationale is information-theoretic, and you’re objecting to uploads? But I have no hard statistics on, say, how many signed up Alcor or CI members are anti-uploading besides Ettinger.
I don’t think this is the case. Self-identification with your own body can be a strong part of this. I for example personally have a deep emotional connection to my body to the point where I’m much more inclined to do something that has a chance of keeping my brain intact in roughly the same form than an uploaded scan.
Was asking about DanielLC’s alternative “neurons/chips” argument, though I’m still not quite sure what its exact content is. Most of the anti-uploading arguments I’ve seen look like they’re either explicitly or implicitly on the “different atoms” grounds. Don’t recall many that argue for a fundamental unworkability based on some more sophisticated isomorphism failure.