I feel the main disanalogy with the Muslim theology case is that elite common sense does not regard top Muslim philosophers as having much comparative expertise on the question of whether Allah exists, but they would regard top physicists as having very strong comparative expertise on the interpretation of quantum mechanics. By this I mean that elite common sense would generally substantially defer to the opinions of the physicists but not the Muslim philosophers. This disanalogy is sufficiently important to me that I find the overall argument by analogy highly non-compelling.
I note that there are some meaningful respects in which elite common sense would regard the Muslim philosophers as epistemic authorities. They would recognize their authority as people who know about what the famous arguments for Allah’s existence and nature are, what the famous objections and replies are, and what has been said about intricacies of related metaphysical questions, for example.
The big difference is that the atheist arguments are not reliant upon Muslim philosophy in the way in which all possible MWI arguments rely on physics. The relevant questions are subtle aspects of physics—linearity, quantum gravity, etc. related, there are unresolved issues in physics to which many potential solutions are MWI unfriendly—precisely in the ballpark of your “quantum gravity vs. string theory” where you do not even know how two terms relate to each other, nor know how advanced physics relates to MWI.
1.3 billion Muslims—including many national leaders, scientists, and other impressive people throughout the Islamic world—believe that Mohammad was an authority on whether Allah exists.
Of course, there are plenty of others who do not, so I’m not suggesting we conclude it’s probable that he was, but it seems like something we couldn’t rule out, either.
Religion is a set of memes, not in the Internet sense of “catchy saying’ but in the slightly older sense that it has characteristics which lead to it spreading. I suggest modifying the original proposal: in deciding who is trustworthy to many people, you should take into account that beliefs which are good at spreading for reasons unrelated to their truth value can skew the “many people” part.
Given what we know about how religions spread, religious beliefs should be excluded on these grounds alone. If scientists who expressed a particular belief about science were killed, that would apply to scientists too (the fact that most trusted scientists in Stalinist Russia believed in Lysenkoism, since the others were dead or silenced, would not be a reason for you to do so).
So is culture. Are you ready to demand culture-neutrality?
If scientists who expressed a particular belief about science were killed, that would apply to scientists too
Would that apply also to scientists who were prevented from getting grants and being published? How do you know, without hindsight, which of the two warring scientific factions consists of cranks and crooks, and which one does not?
So is culture. Are you ready to demand culture-neutrality?
It is possible for a culture to at least not be inimical to truth. But to the extent that a religion is not inimical to truth, it has ceased to be a religion.
Would that apply also to scientists who were prevented from getting grants and being published?
If the main reason why scientists don’t express a belief is that if they do they would be arbitrarily denied grants and publication, then it would apply. However, in the modern Western world, almost every example* where someone made this claim has turned out to be a crank whose lack of publication was for very good reasons. As such, my default assumption will be that this has not occurred unless I have a specific reason to believe that it has.
I can think of a few cases involving politically correct subjects but those tend to have other kinds of problems.
I feel the main disanalogy with the Muslim theology case is that elite common sense does not regard top Muslim philosophers as having much comparative expertise on the question of whether Allah exists, but they would regard top physicists as having very strong comparative expertise on the interpretation of quantum mechanics. By this I mean that elite common sense would generally substantially defer to the opinions of the physicists but not the Muslim philosophers. This disanalogy is sufficiently important to me that I find the overall argument by analogy highly non-compelling.
I note that there are some meaningful respects in which elite common sense would regard the Muslim philosophers as epistemic authorities. They would recognize their authority as people who know about what the famous arguments for Allah’s existence and nature are, what the famous objections and replies are, and what has been said about intricacies of related metaphysical questions, for example.
The big difference is that the atheist arguments are not reliant upon Muslim philosophy in the way in which all possible MWI arguments rely on physics. The relevant questions are subtle aspects of physics—linearity, quantum gravity, etc. related, there are unresolved issues in physics to which many potential solutions are MWI unfriendly—precisely in the ballpark of your “quantum gravity vs. string theory” where you do not even know how two terms relate to each other, nor know how advanced physics relates to MWI.
1.3 billion Muslims—including many national leaders, scientists, and other impressive people throughout the Islamic world—believe that Mohammad was an authority on whether Allah exists.
Of course, there are plenty of others who do not, so I’m not suggesting we conclude it’s probable that he was, but it seems like something we couldn’t rule out, either.
Religion is a set of memes, not in the Internet sense of “catchy saying’ but in the slightly older sense that it has characteristics which lead to it spreading. I suggest modifying the original proposal: in deciding who is trustworthy to many people, you should take into account that beliefs which are good at spreading for reasons unrelated to their truth value can skew the “many people” part.
Given what we know about how religions spread, religious beliefs should be excluded on these grounds alone. If scientists who expressed a particular belief about science were killed, that would apply to scientists too (the fact that most trusted scientists in Stalinist Russia believed in Lysenkoism, since the others were dead or silenced, would not be a reason for you to do so).
So is culture. Are you ready to demand culture-neutrality?
Would that apply also to scientists who were prevented from getting grants and being published? How do you know, without hindsight, which of the two warring scientific factions consists of cranks and crooks, and which one does not?
It is possible for a culture to at least not be inimical to truth. But to the extent that a religion is not inimical to truth, it has ceased to be a religion.
If the main reason why scientists don’t express a belief is that if they do they would be arbitrarily denied grants and publication, then it would apply. However, in the modern Western world, almost every example* where someone made this claim has turned out to be a crank whose lack of publication was for very good reasons. As such, my default assumption will be that this has not occurred unless I have a specific reason to believe that it has.
I can think of a few cases involving politically correct subjects but those tend to have other kinds of problems.