Do you have in mind average people, or, e.g., top 10% Ivy Leaguers … ?
Both. Remember that many Ivy Leaguers are liberal-arts majors. Even many that are quantitatively oriented I suspect aren’t familiar with the literature. I guess it takes a certain level of sophistication to think that voting doesn’t make a difference in expectation, so maybe most people fall into the bucket of those who haven’t really thought about the matter rigorously at all. (Remember, we’re including English and Art majors here.)
You could say, “If they knew the arguments, they would be persuaded,” which may be true, but that doesn’t explain why they already vote without knowing the arguments. Explaining that suggests deontology as a candidate hypothesis.
These reasons aren’t obviously deontological (even though they might sound like they are on first hearing).
“It’s a civic duty” is deontological if anything is, because deontology is duty-based ethics.
“If everyone didn’t vote, things would be bad” is an application of Kant’s categorical imperative.
“Our forefathers died for this, so we shouldn’t waste it” is not deontological—just the sunk-cost fallacy.
Even if people did explicitly describe their reasons as deontological, one still wouldn’t know whether this was the case, because people’s stated reasons are often different from their actual reasons.
At some point it may become a debate about the teleological level at which you assess their “reasons.” As individuals, it’s very likely the value of voting is terminal in some sense, based on cultural acclimation. Taking a broader view of why society itself developed this tendency, you might say that it did so for more consequentialist / instrumental reasons.
It’s similar to assessing the “reason” why a mother cares for her child. At an individual / neural level it’s based on reward circuitry. At a broader evolutionary level, it’s based on bequeathing genes.
The main point to my mind here is that apparently deontological beliefs may originate from a combination of consequentialist values with an implicit understanding of timeless decision theory.
Both. Remember that many Ivy Leaguers are liberal-arts majors. Even many that are quantitatively oriented I suspect aren’t familiar with the literature. I guess it takes a certain level of sophistication to think that voting doesn’t make a difference in expectation, so maybe most people fall into the bucket of those who haven’t really thought about the matter rigorously at all. (Remember, we’re including English and Art majors here.)
You could say, “If they knew the arguments, they would be persuaded,” which may be true, but that doesn’t explain why they already vote without knowing the arguments. Explaining that suggests deontology as a candidate hypothesis.
“It’s a civic duty” is deontological if anything is, because deontology is duty-based ethics.
“If everyone didn’t vote, things would be bad” is an application of Kant’s categorical imperative.
“Our forefathers died for this, so we shouldn’t waste it” is not deontological—just the sunk-cost fallacy.
At some point it may become a debate about the teleological level at which you assess their “reasons.” As individuals, it’s very likely the value of voting is terminal in some sense, based on cultural acclimation. Taking a broader view of why society itself developed this tendency, you might say that it did so for more consequentialist / instrumental reasons.
It’s similar to assessing the “reason” why a mother cares for her child. At an individual / neural level it’s based on reward circuitry. At a broader evolutionary level, it’s based on bequeathing genes.
The main point to my mind here is that apparently deontological beliefs may originate from a combination of consequentialist values with an implicit understanding of timeless decision theory.