It seems to me that you are mainly using this framework in cases involving charity and setting policy to affect long run outcomes, i.e. cases where the short run individual selfish (CDT) impact of good decisions is low. But by the logic above that is one of the places where the framework would be less applicable.
[Edited to add: This may be a stronger point than my original comment recognized. One thing I’d like to add in addition is that a lot of effective altruism topics are pretty apolitical. The fact that we can get people to think rationally about apolitical topics much more easily, and thereby allow us to stress-test our views about these topics much more easily, seems like a significant consideration in favor of avoiding politically-charged topics. I didn’t fully appreciate that before thinking about Carl’s comment.]
I agree that this is a consideration in favor of thinking it isn’t helpful to think carefully about how to set policy to affect long-run outcomes. One qualifier is that when I said people’s “interests,” I didn’t mean to limit my claim to their “selfish interests” or their concern about what happens right now. I meant to focus on the desires that they currently have, including their present concerns about the welfare of others and the future of humanity.
Another issue is that we have strong evidence that certain types of careful thinking about how to do good does result in conclusions that can command wide support in the form of GiveWell’s success so far. I see GiveWell’s work as in many ways continuous with trying to find out how to optimize for long-run impact.
I think there is more uncertainty about the value of trying to move into speculative considerations about very long-run impacts. This framework may ultimately suggest that you can’t arrive at conclusions that will command the support of a broad coalition of impressive people. This would be an update against the value of looking into speculative issues. I hope to find some areas where credible work can be done, and I’m optimistic that people who do care about long-run outcomes will be help stress-test my conclusions. I also hope to articulate more of my thinking about why it is potentially helpful to try to think about speculative long-run considerations.
[Edited to add: This may be a stronger point than my original comment recognized. One thing I’d like to add in addition is that a lot of effective altruism topics are pretty apolitical. The fact that we can get people to think rationally about apolitical topics much more easily, and thereby allow us to stress-test our views about these topics much more easily, seems like a significant consideration in favor of avoiding politically-charged topics. I didn’t fully appreciate that before thinking about Carl’s comment.]
I agree that this is a consideration in favor of thinking it isn’t helpful to think carefully about how to set policy to affect long-run outcomes. One qualifier is that when I said people’s “interests,” I didn’t mean to limit my claim to their “selfish interests” or their concern about what happens right now. I meant to focus on the desires that they currently have, including their present concerns about the welfare of others and the future of humanity.
Another issue is that we have strong evidence that certain types of careful thinking about how to do good does result in conclusions that can command wide support in the form of GiveWell’s success so far. I see GiveWell’s work as in many ways continuous with trying to find out how to optimize for long-run impact.
I think there is more uncertainty about the value of trying to move into speculative considerations about very long-run impacts. This framework may ultimately suggest that you can’t arrive at conclusions that will command the support of a broad coalition of impressive people. This would be an update against the value of looking into speculative issues. I hope to find some areas where credible work can be done, and I’m optimistic that people who do care about long-run outcomes will be help stress-test my conclusions. I also hope to articulate more of my thinking about why it is potentially helpful to try to think about speculative long-run considerations.