By “modus ponens doesn’t necessarily motivate,” do you mean that someone could see that modus ponens applies yet not draw the inference? That seems correct, but I don’t see how this makes metaethical motivational judgment internalism (MMJI) uninteresting. Are you saying that MMJI is obviously false, and so vallinder’s point becomes uninteresting because nobody could possibly be that stupid as to come by this route to being at odds with the orthogonality thesis? It seems unlikely that’s your point … everyone who’s ever said “nobody could possibly be that stupid” has been wrong (and I’m out to prove it!) … so then I just don’t get it.
a form of judgment internalism, which holds that a necessary connection exists between sincere moral judgment and either justifying reasons or motives: necessarily, if an individual sincerely judges that she ought to φ, then she has a reason or motive to φ
I call it a metaethical thesis because its advocates usually consider it part of the meaning of ethical judgments.
By “modus ponens doesn’t necessarily motivate,” do you mean that someone could see that modus ponens applies yet not draw the inference? That seems correct, but I don’t see how this makes metaethical motivational judgment internalism (MMJI) uninteresting. Are you saying that MMJI is obviously false, and so vallinder’s point becomes uninteresting because nobody could possibly be that stupid as to come by this route to being at odds with the orthogonality thesis? It seems unlikely that’s your point … everyone who’s ever said “nobody could possibly be that stupid” has been wrong (and I’m out to prove it!) … so then I just don’t get it.
Would you mind explaining what MMJI is?
SEP calls it
I call it a metaethical thesis because its advocates usually consider it part of the meaning of ethical judgments.