I think the problem lies in your usage of the phrase “objective fact”.
For example, if I claim “broccoli is tasty”, my claim purports to report a fact. Plausibly, it purports to report a fact about me—namely, that I like broccoli. If someone else were to claim “broccoli is tasty”, her utterance would also purport to report a fact—plausibly, the fact that she likes broccoli. So two token utterances of the very same type may pick out different facts. If this is the case, “broccoli is tasty” is true when asserted by broccoli-lovers and false when asserted by broccoli-haters. This should not be surprising, provided that it is interpreted as a disguised indexical claim.
Clearly, there is no experimental process whereby all right-thinking people can conclude that broccoli is tasty (or, alternatively, that broccoli is not tasty), even though several right-thinking people can justifiably arrive at this conclusion (by eating broccoli and liking it, say). Crucially, this conclusion is consistent with being a realist about broccoli-tastiness, but inconsistent with thinking there are objective facts about broccoli-tastiness (as you use the term). Likewise, one can be a realist about morality without thinking there are objective facts about morality (again, as you use the term).
When I say “objective fact”, I mean (in context) a non-indexical one.
The original problem I raised was that some people who talked about things being “moral” meant those statements indexically, and others meant them objectively, and this created a lot of confusion.
one can be a realist about morality without thinking there are objective facts about morality (again, as you use the term).
I use the term “objective facts about morality” to mean “non-indexical facts which do not depend on picking out the person holding the moral beliefs”. Moral realism is the belief such objective facts about morality can and/or do exist.
Of course, one is free to interpret “moral realism” as you do—it’s a natural enough interpretation, and may even be the most common one among philosophers. However, this is not the definition given in the SEP. According to it, “moral realists are those who think that...moral claims do purport to report facts and are true if they get the facts right”. This does not entail that moral realists think that moral claims purport to report objective facts. But isn’t such a loose interpretation of “moral realism” vacuous? As you say:
If SEP’s usage of “fact” is taken to mean “a fact about the person holding the moral belief”, the fact being that the person does hold that belief, then I don’t understand what it would mean to say that there aren’t any moral facts (i.e. moral anti-realism).
The moral anti-realist can choose from among two main alternatives if she wishes to deny moral realism, which I understand as being committed to the following two theses: (1) moral claims purport to report some (not necessarily objective) facts, and (2) some moral claims are true. First, she can maintain that all moral claims are false, which is a plausible suggestion: perhaps our moral claims purport to be about some normative aspect of the world, but the world lacks this normative aspect. Second, she can maintain that no moral claims purport to report facts; instead, all moral claims express emotions. On this view, saying “setting cats on fire is wrong” is tantamount to exclaiming “Boo!” or “Ew!”
First, she can maintain that all moral claims are false, which is a plausible suggestion: perhaps our moral claims purport to be about some normative aspect of the world, but the world lacks this normative aspect.
That would still be discussing an objective claim—just one that happens to be false. On a part with discussing a mathematical proposition which is false, or an empirical hypothesis which is false: both of these are independent of the person who says them or believes in them. Just so, discussing normative aspects of the world—whether they exist or not, and whether they are as claimed or not—isn’t the same as discussing normative beliefs of a person.
So calling this moral anti-realism seems to use my sense of “moral realism” (objective fact), not the SEP’s.
Second, she can maintain that no moral claims purport to report facts; instead, all moral claims express emotions. On this view, saying “setting cats on fire is wrong” is tantamount to exclaiming “Boo!” or “Ew!”
In one way, this is again moral anti-realism in my sense of the phrase: the claim that morals don’t exist separately from the moral beliefs of concrete persons. (I hold this view.)
In another way, it can be read as a claim about what people mean when they talk about morals. In that case, the claim is plainly wrong, because many people are moral realists.
So to sum up, I’m afraid I still don’t see what it would mean to be a moral anti-realist in what you say is the SEP sense.
I think the problem lies in your usage of the phrase “objective fact”.
For example, if I claim “broccoli is tasty”, my claim purports to report a fact. Plausibly, it purports to report a fact about me—namely, that I like broccoli. If someone else were to claim “broccoli is tasty”, her utterance would also purport to report a fact—plausibly, the fact that she likes broccoli. So two token utterances of the very same type may pick out different facts. If this is the case, “broccoli is tasty” is true when asserted by broccoli-lovers and false when asserted by broccoli-haters. This should not be surprising, provided that it is interpreted as a disguised indexical claim.
Clearly, there is no experimental process whereby all right-thinking people can conclude that broccoli is tasty (or, alternatively, that broccoli is not tasty), even though several right-thinking people can justifiably arrive at this conclusion (by eating broccoli and liking it, say). Crucially, this conclusion is consistent with being a realist about broccoli-tastiness, but inconsistent with thinking there are objective facts about broccoli-tastiness (as you use the term). Likewise, one can be a realist about morality without thinking there are objective facts about morality (again, as you use the term).
When I say “objective fact”, I mean (in context) a non-indexical one.
The original problem I raised was that some people who talked about things being “moral” meant those statements indexically, and others meant them objectively, and this created a lot of confusion.
I use the term “objective facts about morality” to mean “non-indexical facts which do not depend on picking out the person holding the moral beliefs”. Moral realism is the belief such objective facts about morality can and/or do exist.
Of course, one is free to interpret “moral realism” as you do—it’s a natural enough interpretation, and may even be the most common one among philosophers. However, this is not the definition given in the SEP. According to it, “moral realists are those who think that...moral claims do purport to report facts and are true if they get the facts right”. This does not entail that moral realists think that moral claims purport to report objective facts. But isn’t such a loose interpretation of “moral realism” vacuous? As you say:
The moral anti-realist can choose from among two main alternatives if she wishes to deny moral realism, which I understand as being committed to the following two theses: (1) moral claims purport to report some (not necessarily objective) facts, and (2) some moral claims are true. First, she can maintain that all moral claims are false, which is a plausible suggestion: perhaps our moral claims purport to be about some normative aspect of the world, but the world lacks this normative aspect. Second, she can maintain that no moral claims purport to report facts; instead, all moral claims express emotions. On this view, saying “setting cats on fire is wrong” is tantamount to exclaiming “Boo!” or “Ew!”
That would still be discussing an objective claim—just one that happens to be false. On a part with discussing a mathematical proposition which is false, or an empirical hypothesis which is false: both of these are independent of the person who says them or believes in them. Just so, discussing normative aspects of the world—whether they exist or not, and whether they are as claimed or not—isn’t the same as discussing normative beliefs of a person.
So calling this moral anti-realism seems to use my sense of “moral realism” (objective fact), not the SEP’s.
In one way, this is again moral anti-realism in my sense of the phrase: the claim that morals don’t exist separately from the moral beliefs of concrete persons. (I hold this view.)
In another way, it can be read as a claim about what people mean when they talk about morals. In that case, the claim is plainly wrong, because many people are moral realists.
So to sum up, I’m afraid I still don’t see what it would mean to be a moral anti-realist in what you say is the SEP sense.