I would expect to find people with very skewed senses of reality (as seen in schizophrenia). I don’t consider that the same as a preference. What’s currently called antisocial personality disorder, also known as psychopathy or sociopathy, I might consider more a preference (in that it deals with how they value other people’s wellbeing, not from their perception of reality).
Thanks for the serious response. I see what you mean. My unease about these kind of explanations is the asymmetry between the kinds of terms used to explain why someone would choose to commit a horrible act and the kinds of terms used to explain why someone wouldn’t choose to commit a horrible act. After rethinking it though, I agree that making reference to beliefs in addition to preferences does add explanatory power, but I’m not very certain of this. After all, we make reference to the same physical laws to explain why a bridge stays up as when it falls down; but when we explain “normal” behavior, we talk about preferences and constraints, without saying anything about having non-schizophrenia.
I wouldn’t be surprised to hear that someone who attacked strangers for no apparent reason was experiencing delusions or hallucinations. I would be surprised to hear that someone with sociopathy did so, because they normally hurt people only for personal gain, and there’s nothing to gain from opening fire on a crowd.
And yet, fame is a very common preference among humans and this guy is now world famous (he even has his own thread on Less Wrong!). Depending on how strong his fame-preference is, we can’t rule out that these tactics weren’t instrumentally rational in his particular case.
Hearing voices is not a preference.
Maybe, IDK. Do you never hear voices? I hear a voice (it sounds very similar to my normal speaking voice, but not exactly). As far as I can tell, this is just what linguistic thinking feels like from the inside. I can even make it go away by using my visual imagination, doing strenuous physical exercise, or practicing mindfulness meditation. The extent that I do make it go away seems to be determined by my personal preferences and the constraints imposed by my environment.
After all, we make reference to the same physical laws to explain why a bridge stays up as when it falls down; but when we explain “normal” behavior, we talk about preferences and constraints, without saying anything about having non-schizophrenia.
I don’t understand the analogy. Explanations why a bridge stays up usually point out different physical laws than explanations why it had fallen down. You rarely hear “the bridge stays up because the construction hasn’t corroded and the engineers made no mistake”, unless there is a reason to suspect something wrong with the bridge.
Thanks for the serious response. I see what you mean. My unease about these kind of explanations is the asymmetry between the kinds of terms used to explain why someone would choose to commit a horrible act and the kinds of terms used to explain why someone wouldn’t choose to commit a horrible act. After rethinking it though, I agree that making reference to beliefs in addition to preferences does add explanatory power, but I’m not very certain of this. After all, we make reference to the same physical laws to explain why a bridge stays up as when it falls down; but when we explain “normal” behavior, we talk about preferences and constraints, without saying anything about having non-schizophrenia.
And yet, fame is a very common preference among humans and this guy is now world famous (he even has his own thread on Less Wrong!). Depending on how strong his fame-preference is, we can’t rule out that these tactics weren’t instrumentally rational in his particular case.
Maybe, IDK. Do you never hear voices? I hear a voice (it sounds very similar to my normal speaking voice, but not exactly). As far as I can tell, this is just what linguistic thinking feels like from the inside. I can even make it go away by using my visual imagination, doing strenuous physical exercise, or practicing mindfulness meditation. The extent that I do make it go away seems to be determined by my personal preferences and the constraints imposed by my environment.
I don’t understand the analogy. Explanations why a bridge stays up usually point out different physical laws than explanations why it had fallen down. You rarely hear “the bridge stays up because the construction hasn’t corroded and the engineers made no mistake”, unless there is a reason to suspect something wrong with the bridge.