Original thoughts arriving in the form of difficult-to-express intuitions is a common phenomenon. Early analytic philosophers were struggling with the right way to express the intuition that “greater(7, 5) = true” and “lesser(5, 7) = true” represent the same fact. Now we know that the correct answer is to derive both as consequences of the same abstract model of the relevant entities (such as natural numbers) whose existence is to an extent independent of the language used to describe it. The function of the model is to take the way a language is used and tie it to a specific semantic structure. It is possible to construct an isomorphic model using a different set of linguistic definitions, a different language.
When we are dealing with more subjective models than numbers, I think most people grope around trying to pinpoint which of a set of models that are identical on certain points best suits the criteria satisfying their background mental makeup for the meaning they want to express. George Orwell’s advice to let the meaning pick the words rather than words the meaning might be related to this game of carefully picking a meaning first, and then searching for the words that best express that meaning. So while I agree with some of the points raised in the main post, I would suggest that other people not using the same words to make the same argument as you is not a great reason to think it is incompatible with yours in the places that matter to each of you.
It might be worthwhile to examine where two models we’re comparing diverge in objective consequences that are important, and where divergence is only a matter of subjective language use. The question of prime significance in the Roman example for me is not whether charity is for the glory of the emperor or for the betterment of the poor, but whether the Roman is in favor of undertaking charity in such a way that appearance of imperial glory is optimized or such that the effects of the social safety net are optimized.
If he says that imperial glory demands the optimization of the social safety net, then our differences might amount to a fight over words, at least over this bit of argumentation, from my side. He may attach importance and place emphasis elsewhere, but unless I abstract away some background information by defining criteria to identify local isomorphisms, no two arguments made by two people might ever be the same. If he says that he wants to optimize imperial glory irrespective of its effects on the poor, then I have bigger things to worry about. It’s wrong for me to conflate my argument with his in that case, because the premise that the Roman is making the same argument as me is false in the areas that matter to me. In fact, owing to my misunderstanding, the stronger reasons I provide for “his argument” will in any case be irrelevant to the argument the Roman is actually making.
As long as you exercise careful discernment in determining whether or not differences are meaningful to the argument being made or quibbles over words, and to identify where the differences come from, which parts of the argument are important to each of you and why you disagree, I don’t see where the problem is. Once all these provisos and disclaimers are out of the way, feel free to be inspired by the Roman’s argument for charity to invent your original Age of Enlightenment argument for charity.
The Roman might even respond with, “Yes, finally you’re starting to see sense. Charity is a good thing like I maintained all along. You still don’t appreciate the true importance of imperial glory, but you’ll come around to my way of thinking eventually.” Or if he wants to convince you that charity is a good thing within your system of ethics, if only because he thinks it’s important for you to broadcast American glory for some reason, or if he just wanted to challenge your worldview as an impartial critic by asking why you don’t support charity if helping others is so important to you, then your own argument might be just the thing he was looking for, irrespective of the alienness of his worldview.
Original thoughts arriving in the form of difficult-to-express intuitions is a common phenomenon. Early analytic philosophers were struggling with the right way to express the intuition that “greater(7, 5) = true” and “lesser(5, 7) = true” represent the same fact. Now we know that the correct answer is to derive both as consequences of the same abstract model of the relevant entities (such as natural numbers) whose existence is to an extent independent of the language used to describe it. The function of the model is to take the way a language is used and tie it to a specific semantic structure. It is possible to construct an isomorphic model using a different set of linguistic definitions, a different language.
When we are dealing with more subjective models than numbers, I think most people grope around trying to pinpoint which of a set of models that are identical on certain points best suits the criteria satisfying their background mental makeup for the meaning they want to express. George Orwell’s advice to let the meaning pick the words rather than words the meaning might be related to this game of carefully picking a meaning first, and then searching for the words that best express that meaning. So while I agree with some of the points raised in the main post, I would suggest that other people not using the same words to make the same argument as you is not a great reason to think it is incompatible with yours in the places that matter to each of you.
It might be worthwhile to examine where two models we’re comparing diverge in objective consequences that are important, and where divergence is only a matter of subjective language use. The question of prime significance in the Roman example for me is not whether charity is for the glory of the emperor or for the betterment of the poor, but whether the Roman is in favor of undertaking charity in such a way that appearance of imperial glory is optimized or such that the effects of the social safety net are optimized.
If he says that imperial glory demands the optimization of the social safety net, then our differences might amount to a fight over words, at least over this bit of argumentation, from my side. He may attach importance and place emphasis elsewhere, but unless I abstract away some background information by defining criteria to identify local isomorphisms, no two arguments made by two people might ever be the same. If he says that he wants to optimize imperial glory irrespective of its effects on the poor, then I have bigger things to worry about. It’s wrong for me to conflate my argument with his in that case, because the premise that the Roman is making the same argument as me is false in the areas that matter to me. In fact, owing to my misunderstanding, the stronger reasons I provide for “his argument” will in any case be irrelevant to the argument the Roman is actually making.
As long as you exercise careful discernment in determining whether or not differences are meaningful to the argument being made or quibbles over words, and to identify where the differences come from, which parts of the argument are important to each of you and why you disagree, I don’t see where the problem is. Once all these provisos and disclaimers are out of the way, feel free to be inspired by the Roman’s argument for charity to invent your original Age of Enlightenment argument for charity.
The Roman might even respond with, “Yes, finally you’re starting to see sense. Charity is a good thing like I maintained all along. You still don’t appreciate the true importance of imperial glory, but you’ll come around to my way of thinking eventually.” Or if he wants to convince you that charity is a good thing within your system of ethics, if only because he thinks it’s important for you to broadcast American glory for some reason, or if he just wanted to challenge your worldview as an impartial critic by asking why you don’t support charity if helping others is so important to you, then your own argument might be just the thing he was looking for, irrespective of the alienness of his worldview.
Does that make sense?