Poll: Consequentialism and the motive for holding true beliefs
1. Is an action’s moral status (rightness or wrongness) dictated solely by its consequences? [pollid:685]
(For calibration — I would expect people who identify strongly as consequentialists to answer “strong yes” on question 1, while people who identify strongly as deontologists to answer “strong no”, while people who are somewhere in between would choose one of the middle buttons based on how they lean.)
2. Is the truth value (truth or falsity) of a belief about the world dictated solely by its predictive value? [pollid:686]
(By “belief about the world” I explicitly mean to bracket beliefs about, for instance, mathematical formalisms.)
3. Is possessing the truth an end in itself; as opposed to being valuable for instrumental reasons, for instance that true beliefs equip us to choose our actions better? [pollid:687]
4. Do you expect that — all else being equal — a person equipped with more true beliefs and fewer false ones is more likely to accomplish that person’s goals or intentions? [pollid:688]
5. Do you expect that — all else being equal — a person equipped with more true beliefs and fewer false ones is more likely to take actions that are more morally right and less morally wrong? [pollid:689]
Poll: Consequentialism and the motive for holding true beliefs
1. Is an action’s moral status (rightness or wrongness) dictated solely by its consequences? [pollid:685]
(For calibration — I would expect people who identify strongly as consequentialists to answer “strong yes” on question 1, while people who identify strongly as deontologists to answer “strong no”, while people who are somewhere in between would choose one of the middle buttons based on how they lean.)
2. Is the truth value (truth or falsity) of a belief about the world dictated solely by its predictive value? [pollid:686]
(By “belief about the world” I explicitly mean to bracket beliefs about, for instance, mathematical formalisms.)
3. Is possessing the truth an end in itself; as opposed to being valuable for instrumental reasons, for instance that true beliefs equip us to choose our actions better? [pollid:687]
4. Do you expect that — all else being equal — a person equipped with more true beliefs and fewer false ones is more likely to accomplish that person’s goals or intentions? [pollid:688]
5. Do you expect that — all else being equal — a person equipped with more true beliefs and fewer false ones is more likely to take actions that are more morally right and less morally wrong? [pollid:689]
In question 1, is “consequences” supposed to mean “actual consequences”, “expected consequences”, “foreseeable consequences”…?
Any of the above.