I’ve also been noticing that there are a bunch of notions of “rationality” being thrown around. This is because “rationality” is used to describe different domains of thought, and in each of these domains, the term has fundamentally different meanings (some of which you were getting at). Here are at least some of them:
Deductive rationality: This one is relatively easy. When talking about the rationality of a deductive argument, we mean that the argument is valid (the conclusions follow from the premises), and we often also mean that the premises are true.
Inductive rationality: This type of rationality governs empirical claims. There a various controversies about when inductive arguments are rational or not, which I won’t get into but are well-explored in the philosophy of science.
Moral rationality: What does it mean to say that a moral argument is rational? Having the argument be deductively valid would be a necessary condition, but might not be sufficient. Whether you are a moral skeptic or not, the truth conditions for moral prescriptions are different from the truth conditions of descriptive claims about the world.
Pragmatic rationality: This is the rationality of an agent’s actions relative to that agent’s goals.
Lack of emotion: If someone is being emotional, it doesn’t necessarily mean their arguments lack the forms of rationality above. This is the one usage of the term “rationality” that is arguably bogus, since rationality is at best moderately correlated with lack of emotionality.
In short, when we say:
“Your mathematical proof is rational”
“Your scientific theory is rational”
“Human rights are rational”
“Your decisions are rational”
“Calm down and be rational!”
the notion of rationality invoked in each of these statements is different.
But how different? Is there a generalized mode of thinking that leads to rationality in all these domains (except, perhaps, lack of emotion, since I think that a bogus notion of rationality)?
Deductive and inductive reasoning are indeed distinct, yet with moral and pragmatic reasoning, once you accept certain premises about the rightness or effectiveness of certain actions, then those problems break down into deduction and induction.
Deduction and induction themselves have similarities, in that both involve the consistent application of rules and principles, though in the case of induction, those rules are more complex and debatable. So your definition of rationality, “having explicit and conscious standards of validity, and applying them in a systematic way,” is at least necessary, but not quite sufficient. As others have observed, more elaboration on the actual nature of those standards of validity is necessary. For example, a religion might involve explicit/conscious/systematic standards of validity, some of which come from divine revelation. Yet we should hesitate in labeling it rational, since those standards are suspect, because the divine revelation they rest on fails to pass explicit/conscious/systematic standards of validity.
A good start would be to make your requirement for application of explicit/conscious/systematic recursive, though then we would need a way to avoid infinite regress.
Deductive rationality: When talking about the rationality of a deductive argument, we mean that the argument is valid (the conclusions follow from the premises), and we often also mean that the premises are true.
I disagree with giving rationality this definition. The word you have defined here is “sound”. Having an untrue premise or having an invalid deductive step means that an argument is unsound, but it doesn’t necessarily mean that it’s irrational. An argument may be rational but mistaken, provided (1) the argument was made in good faith, (2) reasonable effort (but not necessarily extensive effort) was put into avoiding mistakes like the one that was made, and (3) the argument is withdrawn when the error is pointed out.
I’m trying to observe what people are using “rational” to mean. I agree with you that an argument can be rational even if the premises are false, as long as they are not known to be false by the arguer.
I’d be more comfortable with leaving the “are not known to be false by the arguer”. In this context, where we are evaluating an argument as rational, it’s simpler to leave off subjective states of the arguer. That saves all sorts of messy complications regarding motive and uncertainty. Making a rational argument from premises that are known to
though then we would need a way to avoid infinite regress.
You don’t always need a way to avoid infinite regress. It’s one of the skeptical problems of justification, but as long as you’re trying to justify things there’s no good reason to prefer eliminating that one rather than any of the others.
I don’t think infinite regress is an insurmountable problem for the notion that beliefs are rational when they can be justified recursively by rules. I want to acknowledge the skeptical problem of justification, but try to describe rationality in a way that belief systems including something like causation are rational, while belief systems like intelligent design are not.
I want to acknowledge the skeptical problem of justification, but try to describe rationality in a way that belief systems including something like causation are rational, while belief systems like intelligent design are not.
Am I understanding you correctly? You describe belief systems like intelligent design as irrational by the very definition of the word rational?
“You describe belief systems like intelligent design as irrational by the very definition of the word rational?”
That’s how definitions work, buddy. They indicate what words mean, and that has consequences for how they’re used.
An problematic use of definitions would to be declare intelligent design to be irrational by definition—that is, the definition of ‘intelligent design’, not of ‘rationality’.
I realized that possible interpretation as I was posting, and I tried to head it off by using the word “describe” rather than “define.”
I think that the definition of rationality is an open question, though I’m sure it has properties which intelligent design violates. For instance, I would say that empirical arguments failing Occam’s Razor, such as intelligent design, are not rational.
Basically, there are bunch of notions of rationality (some of which are competing), such that belief in something like causation is rational though unprovable, disbelief in failures by Occam’s Razor is irrational, radical skepticism is irrational though irrefutable, logical fallacies and other deductive errors are irrational, etc… I think we are looking for a unifying description of rationality that encompasses all of them, if such a thing exists.
I’ve also been noticing that there are a bunch of notions of “rationality” being thrown around. This is because “rationality” is used to describe different domains of thought, and in each of these domains, the term has fundamentally different meanings (some of which you were getting at). Here are at least some of them:
Deductive rationality: This one is relatively easy. When talking about the rationality of a deductive argument, we mean that the argument is valid (the conclusions follow from the premises), and we often also mean that the premises are true.
Inductive rationality: This type of rationality governs empirical claims. There a various controversies about when inductive arguments are rational or not, which I won’t get into but are well-explored in the philosophy of science.
Moral rationality: What does it mean to say that a moral argument is rational? Having the argument be deductively valid would be a necessary condition, but might not be sufficient. Whether you are a moral skeptic or not, the truth conditions for moral prescriptions are different from the truth conditions of descriptive claims about the world.
Pragmatic rationality: This is the rationality of an agent’s actions relative to that agent’s goals.
Lack of emotion: If someone is being emotional, it doesn’t necessarily mean their arguments lack the forms of rationality above. This is the one usage of the term “rationality” that is arguably bogus, since rationality is at best moderately correlated with lack of emotionality.
In short, when we say:
“Your mathematical proof is rational”
“Your scientific theory is rational”
“Human rights are rational”
“Your decisions are rational”
“Calm down and be rational!”
the notion of rationality invoked in each of these statements is different.
But how different? Is there a generalized mode of thinking that leads to rationality in all these domains (except, perhaps, lack of emotion, since I think that a bogus notion of rationality)?
Deductive and inductive reasoning are indeed distinct, yet with moral and pragmatic reasoning, once you accept certain premises about the rightness or effectiveness of certain actions, then those problems break down into deduction and induction.
Deduction and induction themselves have similarities, in that both involve the consistent application of rules and principles, though in the case of induction, those rules are more complex and debatable. So your definition of rationality, “having explicit and conscious standards of validity, and applying them in a systematic way,” is at least necessary, but not quite sufficient. As others have observed, more elaboration on the actual nature of those standards of validity is necessary. For example, a religion might involve explicit/conscious/systematic standards of validity, some of which come from divine revelation. Yet we should hesitate in labeling it rational, since those standards are suspect, because the divine revelation they rest on fails to pass explicit/conscious/systematic standards of validity.
A good start would be to make your requirement for application of explicit/conscious/systematic recursive, though then we would need a way to avoid infinite regress.
HughRistik wrote:
I disagree with giving rationality this definition. The word you have defined here is “sound”. Having an untrue premise or having an invalid deductive step means that an argument is unsound, but it doesn’t necessarily mean that it’s irrational. An argument may be rational but mistaken, provided (1) the argument was made in good faith, (2) reasonable effort (but not necessarily extensive effort) was put into avoiding mistakes like the one that was made, and (3) the argument is withdrawn when the error is pointed out.
I’m trying to observe what people are using “rational” to mean. I agree with you that an argument can be rational even if the premises are false, as long as they are not known to be false by the arguer.
I’d be more comfortable with leaving the “are not known to be false by the arguer”. In this context, where we are evaluating an argument as rational, it’s simpler to leave off subjective states of the arguer. That saves all sorts of messy complications regarding motive and uncertainty. Making a rational argument from premises that are known to
You don’t always need a way to avoid infinite regress. It’s one of the skeptical problems of justification, but as long as you’re trying to justify things there’s no good reason to prefer eliminating that one rather than any of the others.
I don’t think infinite regress is an insurmountable problem for the notion that beliefs are rational when they can be justified recursively by rules. I want to acknowledge the skeptical problem of justification, but try to describe rationality in a way that belief systems including something like causation are rational, while belief systems like intelligent design are not.
Am I understanding you correctly? You describe belief systems like intelligent design as irrational by the very definition of the word rational?
“You describe belief systems like intelligent design as irrational by the very definition of the word rational?”
That’s how definitions work, buddy. They indicate what words mean, and that has consequences for how they’re used.
An problematic use of definitions would to be declare intelligent design to be irrational by definition—that is, the definition of ‘intelligent design’, not of ‘rationality’.
I realized that possible interpretation as I was posting, and I tried to head it off by using the word “describe” rather than “define.”
I think that the definition of rationality is an open question, though I’m sure it has properties which intelligent design violates. For instance, I would say that empirical arguments failing Occam’s Razor, such as intelligent design, are not rational.
Basically, there are bunch of notions of rationality (some of which are competing), such that belief in something like causation is rational though unprovable, disbelief in failures by Occam’s Razor is irrational, radical skepticism is irrational though irrefutable, logical fallacies and other deductive errors are irrational, etc… I think we are looking for a unifying description of rationality that encompasses all of them, if such a thing exists.