This can be used as a conversation stopper and to maintain balance I suggest we also must acknowledge that forbidding it or dismissing it entirely would also be conversation stopper, just one that results in a different conclusion.
The archetypical case where this statement is used is where the context is of the form:
A) A significant group of people do this thing.
B) [implied] If a significant group of people do a thing then it is very likely that it is rational for them to do that thing.
C) [implied] Therefore, it is rational to do this thing.
If there is disagreement about the degree to which premise B is true then it is useful to express that disagreement (to whatever extent that such discussions are useful in the first place). If an unresolvable disagreement about B is discovered then the immediate conversation can be considered to be successful. That is, agreement may be reached that given the premises held the participants are correctly reasoning about the immediate subject and agree that if they had the other’s premise they would have the other’s conclusion. Further argument about the immediate subject is not needed.
The claim is vague, and it’s not clear what it means.
If you consider the claim to be a compressed expression of the claim that B, above, does not hold then hopefully the claim is clear to you. You may still disagree but vagueness claim no longer applies. I do agree that there are surely better ways for Eliezer to express this position than the rather provocative catch phrase that he has adopted.
I would essentially agree with this but refine that the real two competing theses are procedural about what we should do at point B in the argument:
Rule B1: If a significant group of people do a thing, then this in itself may be brought up as evidence that the thing may perhaps be rational, it is not necessary to further develop a thesis about how this group is reasoning correctly. A special thesis may be brought that on this occasion, people are acting irrationally, but this is burdensome and never quite believable with confidence except with the most extreme evidence.
Rule B2: If a significant group of people do a thing, this is an interesting observation, but there are many reasons why people do things, and to feel a slight sense of nervousness at departing their behavior pattern is leftover hunter-gatherer instinct which would poorly serve many of us now. To suppose that the group is acting rationally is a significant and unimplied further statement, which should not be made without specific supporting evidence especially if there seems to be a countervailing object-level argument.
(Hidden incentives which explain why people do what they do are commonplace, but unconscious reasoning will rarely add up to long-term rationality with respect to the original goal criterion being considered. It is both ‘cleverness’ and great implausibility to construct some elaborate pattern of secret knowledge which no one ever speaks explicitly, and Machiavellianness, and unusual personal goals or redefinitions of success, whereby the apparently stupid becomes smart.)
Object level arguments aside, people engaging in behavior A is still nontrivial evidence that behavior A is rational. Sure, it may be weak evidence, and can easily be swamped by object level arguments, but it can’t be entirely discarded.
The dichotomy Rule B1 vs. Rule B2 is a false dichotomy – one can be pretty confident that people are acting irrationally in a given instance even when one isn’t extremely confident, etc.
I meant to suggest that people’s behavior is one countervailing consideration against the position that demanding courseload & grades don’t matter much at the upper echelons, not that it’s very likely that they’re doing the rational thing.
This can be used as a conversation stopper and to maintain balance I suggest we also must acknowledge that forbidding it or dismissing it entirely would also be conversation stopper, just one that results in a different conclusion.
The archetypical case where this statement is used is where the context is of the form:
A) A significant group of people do this thing.
B) [implied] If a significant group of people do a thing then it is very likely that it is rational for them to do that thing.
C) [implied] Therefore, it is rational to do this thing.
If there is disagreement about the degree to which premise B is true then it is useful to express that disagreement (to whatever extent that such discussions are useful in the first place). If an unresolvable disagreement about B is discovered then the immediate conversation can be considered to be successful. That is, agreement may be reached that given the premises held the participants are correctly reasoning about the immediate subject and agree that if they had the other’s premise they would have the other’s conclusion. Further argument about the immediate subject is not needed.
If you consider the claim to be a compressed expression of the claim that B, above, does not hold then hopefully the claim is clear to you. You may still disagree but vagueness claim no longer applies. I do agree that there are surely better ways for Eliezer to express this position than the rather provocative catch phrase that he has adopted.
I would essentially agree with this but refine that the real two competing theses are procedural about what we should do at point B in the argument:
Rule B1: If a significant group of people do a thing, then this in itself may be brought up as evidence that the thing may perhaps be rational, it is not necessary to further develop a thesis about how this group is reasoning correctly. A special thesis may be brought that on this occasion, people are acting irrationally, but this is burdensome and never quite believable with confidence except with the most extreme evidence.
Rule B2: If a significant group of people do a thing, this is an interesting observation, but there are many reasons why people do things, and to feel a slight sense of nervousness at departing their behavior pattern is leftover hunter-gatherer instinct which would poorly serve many of us now. To suppose that the group is acting rationally is a significant and unimplied further statement, which should not be made without specific supporting evidence especially if there seems to be a countervailing object-level argument.
(Hidden incentives which explain why people do what they do are commonplace, but unconscious reasoning will rarely add up to long-term rationality with respect to the original goal criterion being considered. It is both ‘cleverness’ and great implausibility to construct some elaborate pattern of secret knowledge which no one ever speaks explicitly, and Machiavellianness, and unusual personal goals or redefinitions of success, whereby the apparently stupid becomes smart.)
Object level arguments aside, people engaging in behavior A is still nontrivial evidence that behavior A is rational. Sure, it may be weak evidence, and can easily be swamped by object level arguments, but it can’t be entirely discarded.
The dichotomy Rule B1 vs. Rule B2 is a false dichotomy – one can be pretty confident that people are acting irrationally in a given instance even when one isn’t extremely confident, etc.
Strong evidence or it didn’t happen.
That is my default reaction to this concept, having seen it so often on LW applied to unmeasurably small wisps of evidence.
Compare But There’s Still A Chance, Right?. “But It’s Still Evidence, Right?” is the other side of that dud coin.
I meant to suggest that people’s behavior is one countervailing consideration against the position that demanding courseload & grades don’t matter much at the upper echelons, not that it’s very likely that they’re doing the rational thing.