Except that it does, because having been persuaded they extrapolate differently. But maybe by CEV you mean some idealised version.
Your impression that it is obvious that changes in de facto ethics are not changes in basic values rests heavilty on the assumption than basic values are in hardware, not software. That is not obvious , either.
Except that it does, because having been persuaded they extrapolate differently. But maybe by CEV you mean some idealised version.
CEV is not (and was never, AFAIK) meant to be self-applied by one individual to oneself.
More importantly, CEV’s archetypical example of “volition” should show how persuading someone that they want box A doesn’t change their CEV to “obtain A” if they need that diamond to pay for their own food, nor how persuading them that they should not want the diamond and that the diamond is worthless would change the fact that their CEV would still want to get box B, to get the diamond, to sell it, to pay for food, to live longer. No matter how effectively you persuade them that box A is really really shiny and that diamonds are really really evil.
‘There’s a “principled distinction between discussing CEV as an initial dynamic of Friendliness, and discussing CEV as a Nice Place to Live” and his essay was essentially conflating the two definitions. ’
the assumption than basic values are in hardware, not software
The observation that a racist (or whatever) is using, albeit imperfectly, the same criteria to declare various courses of action “right” or “wrong”. What they lack is the knowledge that minorities are not evil mutants.
Except that it does, because having been persuaded they extrapolate differently. But maybe by CEV you mean some idealised version.
Your impression that it is obvious that changes in de facto ethics are not changes in basic values rests heavilty on the assumption than basic values are in hardware, not software. That is not obvious , either.
CEV is not (and was never, AFAIK) meant to be self-applied by one individual to oneself.
More importantly, CEV’s archetypical example of “volition” should show how persuading someone that they want box A doesn’t change their CEV to “obtain A” if they need that diamond to pay for their own food, nor how persuading them that they should not want the diamond and that the diamond is worthless would change the fact that their CEV would still want to get box B, to get the diamond, to sell it, to pay for food, to live longer. No matter how effectively you persuade them that box A is really really shiny and that diamonds are really really evil.
Well, that’s your guess.
EDIT: double-post.
‘There’s a “principled distinction between discussing CEV as an initial dynamic of Friendliness, and discussing CEV as a Nice Place to Live” and his essay was essentially conflating the two definitions. ’
Pardon? I think you may have accidentally replied to the wrong comment.
No. Have you ever changed your mind on an ethical question? I’m serious.
...
The observation that a racist (or whatever) is using, albeit imperfectly, the same criteria to declare various courses of action “right” or “wrong”. What they lack is the knowledge that minorities are not evil mutants.