If we increase the social penalty on people who use math to intimidate we will decrease the number of people who use math to intimidate and so on net might reduce the perception among those with low math skills that people with strong math skills use math to intimidate.
In LessWrong terms, this is about the most horrible thing you can say about a society. It reads like an introductory quote to some hyper-Machiavellian book on advertising or political campaigning. Up-voted!
Doesn’t the wisdom of this depend on whether those using math to win status conflicts are right on the merits?
If being good at math is sufficiently likely to make one win status arguments because one is right, the incentive on people to become better at math is probably worth the cost from people using high math skills to win arguments despite being wrong on the merits.
If we increase the social penalty on people who use math to intimidate we will decrease the number of people who use math to intimidate and so on net might reduce the perception among those with low math skills that people with strong math skills use math to intimidate.
Changing the underlying reality seems like a rather roundabout and unreliable method of changing people’s perceptions.
If this wasn’t on LW (and on the rationality quotes thread!) it would deserve to go on the rationality quotes thread.
In LessWrong terms, this is about the most horrible thing you can say about a society. It reads like an introductory quote to some hyper-Machiavellian book on advertising or political campaigning. Up-voted!
Doesn’t the wisdom of this depend on whether those using math to win status conflicts are right on the merits?
If being good at math is sufficiently likely to make one win status arguments because one is right, the incentive on people to become better at math is probably worth the cost from people using high math skills to win arguments despite being wrong on the merits.