Although in theory approval is subject to most of the same strategic voting problems as FPTP, STV/IRV, and Borda count, in practice, approval works quite well.
You’re comparing approval favorably to IRV along dimensions related to strategic voting? That seems bizarre to me. Thinking of cases in which to vote strategically with IRV is relatively difficult—it very rarely matters and only changes the payoffs marginally. With approval voting strategic voting is more or less necessary to vote effectively. You need to know where to draw the line on what could have otherwise been a preference ordering in order to minimise the loss of your preference information due to the system.
I probably wouldn’t bother with Concorcet if not for the ability to use computers to do the counting. IRV is much simpler to count by hand. “OK guys. This candidate is out. Let’s take this box, cross off the top name and sort them again.”
You’re comparing approval favorably to IRV along dimensions related to strategic voting?
Yep. Strategic voting for IRV becomes relevant as soon as the third-ranked candidate becomes competitive, and essentially gives you first-past-the-post behavior. It’s less likely to encourage strategic voting than FPTP, and this is definitely important in practice, but it still falls under the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. See, for example, http://minguo.info/election_methods/irv/
It’s true that optimally setting a cut-off in approval is part of the strategy. But there is never an incentive to lie and approve a lessor-favored candidate over a more-favored one. The second is far more informationally damaging. (And I think it is sometimes easier to just measure each candidate against a cut-off rather than doing a full ranking.)
I probably wouldn’t bother with Concorcet if not for the ability to use computers to do the counting. IRV is much simpler to count by hand.
I’d describe that slightly differently—Condorcet is easier to count by hand—it’s just the pairwise races that matter. Determining the winner from the counts involves a bit of skull sweat. IRV, the counting proper needs a separate bucket for each permutation, but is easier to analyze by hand and determine the winner. YMMV, on whether this is a useful distinction.
You’re comparing approval favorably to IRV along dimensions related to strategic voting? That seems bizarre to me. Thinking of cases in which to vote strategically with IRV is relatively difficult—it very rarely matters and only changes the payoffs marginally. With approval voting strategic voting is more or less necessary to vote effectively. You need to know where to draw the line on what could have otherwise been a preference ordering in order to minimise the loss of your preference information due to the system.
I probably wouldn’t bother with Concorcet if not for the ability to use computers to do the counting. IRV is much simpler to count by hand. “OK guys. This candidate is out. Let’s take this box, cross off the top name and sort them again.”
Yep. Strategic voting for IRV becomes relevant as soon as the third-ranked candidate becomes competitive, and essentially gives you first-past-the-post behavior. It’s less likely to encourage strategic voting than FPTP, and this is definitely important in practice, but it still falls under the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. See, for example, http://minguo.info/election_methods/irv/
It’s true that optimally setting a cut-off in approval is part of the strategy. But there is never an incentive to lie and approve a lessor-favored candidate over a more-favored one. The second is far more informationally damaging. (And I think it is sometimes easier to just measure each candidate against a cut-off rather than doing a full ranking.)
I’d describe that slightly differently—Condorcet is easier to count by hand—it’s just the pairwise races that matter. Determining the winner from the counts involves a bit of skull sweat. IRV, the counting proper needs a separate bucket for each permutation, but is easier to analyze by hand and determine the winner. YMMV, on whether this is a useful distinction.