An outstanding summary. It reminded me of stuff I once knew and taught me one or two things I had missed until now. And in two parts to make it easy to upvote it twice.
But the purpose was to cast doubt on MWI. If you are merely pointing out that MWI is a non-relativistic theory, and hence cannot be exactly right, well, ok. But that just means we need a Lorentz invariant version of MWI. But I thought we already have one. Feynman’s sum-over-histories approach.
I guess my question is this: Are you just saying that MWI is wrong because it is not Lorentz invariant, or that it is wrong because it cannot be made Lorentz invariant, or that it is wrong because it cannot be made Lorentz invariant without giving up the interpretation that there are many worlds?
ETA: second question:
… there is the path integral formulation of quantum theory, which doesn’t even need to speak about state space …
I guess I don’t understand the path integral formulation then. I thought the paths being integrated were paths (trajectories) through a kind of state space. How am I wrong?
Are you just saying that MWI is wrong because it is not Lorentz invariant, or that it is wrong because it cannot be made Lorentz invariant, or that it is wrong because it cannot be made Lorentz invariant without giving up the interpretation that there are many worlds?
This is a difficult question. I have written the disclaimer above the grandparent precisely because I am not able to demonstrate that MWI is wrong. I believe MWI can be made Lorentz invariant and retain its interpretation, for the price of losing its intuitive appeal and making it awkward. One can postulate some kind of Lorentz invariant measurement procedure (like the one suggested in articles I’ve linked to) and do the interpretational stuff on the level of observer. In the Schrödinger picture it looks nice—in the Heisenberg picture not so.
My attack doesn’t aim to MWI specifically. I think the objective collapse is even a greater problem. Partly, to include MWI in the statement was part of my dirty tactic to make the statement more prominent, since belief in MWI is accepted here as one of the rationality tests (hell, there is even a sequence about it). But I suspect that the very dispute between collapse and many worlds is an artifact of asking about the behaviour of objective states of the system, and if it is possible to avoid speaking about states, the problem disappears. I want to explain away what MWI proponents want to explain. To further justify my inclusion of MWI specifically in the formulation of my supposedly irrational belief, I can add that, unlike the MWI proponents, there are (and were since the very beginning of the quantum theory) Copenhagenists who accept that the collapse is only a mathematical tool useful within our imperfect understanding of nature and it has no independent ontological status. This is a position with which I sympathise.
But I thought we already have one. Feynman’s sum-over-histories approach.
Could you explain in more detail?
I thought the paths being integrated were paths (trajectories) through a kind of state space.
When the path integral formulation is derived from the standard formulation, one integrates over paths in the phase space. However the integrations over momenta can be performed exactly and one is left with the integration over paths in the configuration space only (which is half of the phase space). This is the form which is prefered, as after the integration sign stands the exponential of action, which is a functional of the classical trajectory or field configuration (we can call both path). These paths needn’t solve the equations of motion, so there even isn’t a correspondence path—state.
We experience a classical world. To explain this “away” would be bad. The broadest interpretation of the phrase “many worlds” is that there are many classical worlds equally real to the single world we experience. Surely you accept this. There are questions of how real is this classical world and where it comes from. The decoherence program tries to address this, though I understand it to be incomplete, or at least controversial.
What gets worse when you move to QFT? You seem concerned with what is ontologically fundamental. The classical states are not ontologically fundamental in ordinary QM. If that’s what you mean by MWI...well, you already admitted to being a troll.
I’m not so concerned about fundamental ontology, so I’m happy to talk about QFT as a bunch of ordinary QM systems, one for each reference frame. The decomposition into classical states is not the same in each frame (ie, is not relativistically covariant). Is this a problem? Isn’t the situation of ordinary QM already almost this bad? In ordinary QM, you can give states classical names, but they don’t actually evolve classically. The macroscale classical worlds that do evolve classically are pretty fuzzy.
[T]here are many classical worlds equally real to the single world we experience. Surely you accept this.
Surely? I don’t even know what it means. Words “real” and “experience” are close neighbours in my vocabulary, real unexperienced world sounds a lot like an oxymoron, at least if not based on a really strong argument.
What gets worse when you move to QFT?
Nothing. I have tried to (incompletely of course) explain the relation between the conventional and relativistic Hamiltonian formalism in case of mechanics, where it is slightly more intuitive and simpler. If you address my first remark, you have disinterpreted it. I don’t say that move to QFT isn’t justified, but that one conventional argument used to support this move isn’t good.
The classical states are not ontologically fundamental in ordinary QM. If that’s what you mean by MWI...
It isn’t. By MWI I mean probably the same thing as anybody else. Nothing particularly related to classical states. I have discussed classical states in order to give some background to my intuitions. My statement was that probably the quantum states are a redundant concept.
I’m happy to talk about QFT as a bunch of ordinary QM systems, one for each reference frame.
I would understand that QFT is a bunch of QM systems, one for each spacetime point. I don’t understand what reference frames do with it. In any fixed reference frame QFT has infinite number of degrees of freedom. Maybe you speak about momentum representation? I am confused.
I suspect that the very dispute between collapse and many worlds is an artifact of asking about the behaviour of objective states of the system, and if it is possible to avoid speaking about states, the problem disappears. I want to explain away what MWI proponents want to explain.
Amen to that. Whenever we cease believing we are working with models and doing phenomenology, and start believing we are dealing with reality and doing ontology; at that point we have stopped doing science and entered the realm of metaphysics.
But I thought we already have one [relativistic MWI]. Feynman’s sum-over-histories approach.
Could you explain in more detail?
Be forewarned that my physics is at the “QM and QFT for Dummies” level. But I thought that a slogan of “one Everett world = one Feynman diagram” had some validity.
At least if you think of really big diagrams. (>5%)
I can add that, unlike the MWI proponents, there are (and were since the very beginning of the quantum theory) Copenhagenists who accept that the collapse is only a mathematical tool useful within our imperfect understanding of nature and it has no independent ontological status.
How do these people interpret interaction-free measurements? Specifically, let’s observe one of the possible outcomes of the Elitzur-Vaidman bomb-tester thought experiment, namely the one that identifies a working bomb without exploding it. To describe this experiment in Copenhagen terms, we could say that the interaction between the photon wave function and the bomb has, as a measurement, collapsed the photon wave function to the upper arm of the interferometer. Since we actually see this result in the detector, and obtain useful information about the bomb from it, I don’t see how we can deny that the collapse has been observed as an actual process while still insisting on Copenhagen. (But I’m sure there is a way to do it, if there are actual physicists who hold this position.)
This relates to the discussion where you’ve apparently participated, and I am not sure whether I can say more. I am quite content with the prediction of the theory, and don’t trust much the feeling of need of further verbal explanation here. If I were pressed to say something, I would say that probably the present formalism of quantum theory isn’t particularly well suited for human intuition. After all, I believe we will get better formalism in future, whatever it means.
The feeling that the collapse is needed somehow to mediate the bomb’s interaction with the detector falls to the same category with the belief that light must propagate in some medium, or a feeling that there must be some absolute time. Such intuitions are sometimes correct, more often wrong.
Based on my experience, most of the ordinary physicists don’t think interpretations of QM are a big issue. It isn’t discussed too often, people are content to do the calculations most of the time. Of course, this may be different among the first-rank researchers.
Just to clarify: in that discussion, I claimed that the bomb tester thought-experiment doesn’t pose any principal difficulty for Copenhagen relative to the standard variations on the double-slit experiment, so that might seem to contradict what I write here. What I meant to say there is that the main feature of the bomb-tester, namely the interaction-free measurement, is also featured in a less salient way in these classic though-experiments, so that Copenhagen also makes sense for the bomb tester if you accept that it makes sense at all.
But if I may ask, how would you reply to the following statement? “Consider the case when we have a dud bomb, and a case when we have a working bomb that doesn’t explode. There is an observable difference between what the detector shows in these outcomes, so replacing the dud bomb with a working one changed the system in a measurable way. We call this change—whatever exactly it might be—collapse.”
Do you believe that this statement would be flawed, or that it is, after all, somehow compatible with the idea that “the collapse is only a mathematical tool”?
Comparing a system with a dud to a system with a working bomb is comparing two different systems, or the same system in two instances with different initial conditions, and thus doesn’t relate to the collapse. I suppose you rather had in mind a statement: “Consider two experiments with a working bomb, and in one the bomb explodes, while in the second it doesn’t. There is an observable difference...”
Well, it is undeniable that there is a difference. The two systems were the same in the beginning and are different in the end. There are three conventional explanations. 1) The systems were different all way long, but in the beginning the difference was invisible for us (hidden parameters). 2) The difference emerged from a non-deterministic process before or during the measurement (collapse). 3) There is no difference, but we see only a portion of reality after the measurement, and a different one in each of the cases (many worlds).
I suggest fourth point of view: Don’t ask in what state the system is, this is meaningless. Ask only what measurement outcomes are possible, given the outcomes we had from the already performed measurements. If you do that, there is no paradox to solve.
There are three conventional explanations. 1) The systems were different all way long, but in the beginning the difference was invisible for us (hidden parameters). 2) The difference emerged from a non-deterministic process before or during the measurement (collapse). [...]
Actually, that’s the distinction I missed! The notion of “collapse” specifically refers to a non-deterministic process, not to a deterministic process that would at some point reveal the previously existing hidden variables.
I suggest fourth point of view: Don’t ask in what state the system is, this is meaningless. Ask only what measurement outcomes are possible, given the outcomes we had from the already performed measurements. If you do that, there is no paradox to solve.
That would basically be the “ensemble interpretation,” right? The theory tells you the probability distribution of outcomes, which you’ll see if you repeat the experiment prepared the same way a bunch of times (frequentism!), and that’s all there is to it. I do have a lot of sympathy for that view, as you might guess from the recent discussion of subjective probabilities, though I cannot say that my superficial understanding of QM gives me much confidence in any views I might hold about it.
The theory tells you the probability distribution of outcomes, which you’ll see if you repeat the experiment prepared the same way a bunch of times (frequentism!), and that’s all there is to it.
Well, the quantum probabilities are certainly frequentist. However, I don’t suppose strict Bayesians deny that there are probabilities with frequentist interpretation. I am also not sure about the label ensemble interpretation. It seems that its proponents somehow deny the validity of QM for small, non-ensemblish systems, which is a position I don’t subscribe to. After all, both collapse and many-world interpretations are no more Bayesian and no less frequentist than the ensemble one. The hidden parameters are deterministic, but have their own well known problems.
As for the frequentist-Bayes controversy, although I am probably more than you sympathetic to the Bayesian position, I have some sympathy for frequentism. I think both interpretation can coexist, with different sensible meanings of “probability”.
An outstanding summary. It reminded me of stuff I once knew and taught me one or two things I had missed until now. And in two parts to make it easy to upvote it twice.
But the purpose was to cast doubt on MWI. If you are merely pointing out that MWI is a non-relativistic theory, and hence cannot be exactly right, well, ok. But that just means we need a Lorentz invariant version of MWI. But I thought we already have one. Feynman’s sum-over-histories approach.
I guess my question is this: Are you just saying that MWI is wrong because it is not Lorentz invariant, or that it is wrong because it cannot be made Lorentz invariant, or that it is wrong because it cannot be made Lorentz invariant without giving up the interpretation that there are many worlds?
ETA: second question:
I guess I don’t understand the path integral formulation then. I thought the paths being integrated were paths (trajectories) through a kind of state space. How am I wrong?
This is a difficult question. I have written the disclaimer above the grandparent precisely because I am not able to demonstrate that MWI is wrong. I believe MWI can be made Lorentz invariant and retain its interpretation, for the price of losing its intuitive appeal and making it awkward. One can postulate some kind of Lorentz invariant measurement procedure (like the one suggested in articles I’ve linked to) and do the interpretational stuff on the level of observer. In the Schrödinger picture it looks nice—in the Heisenberg picture not so.
My attack doesn’t aim to MWI specifically. I think the objective collapse is even a greater problem. Partly, to include MWI in the statement was part of my dirty tactic to make the statement more prominent, since belief in MWI is accepted here as one of the rationality tests (hell, there is even a sequence about it). But I suspect that the very dispute between collapse and many worlds is an artifact of asking about the behaviour of objective states of the system, and if it is possible to avoid speaking about states, the problem disappears. I want to explain away what MWI proponents want to explain. To further justify my inclusion of MWI specifically in the formulation of my supposedly irrational belief, I can add that, unlike the MWI proponents, there are (and were since the very beginning of the quantum theory) Copenhagenists who accept that the collapse is only a mathematical tool useful within our imperfect understanding of nature and it has no independent ontological status. This is a position with which I sympathise.
Could you explain in more detail?
When the path integral formulation is derived from the standard formulation, one integrates over paths in the phase space. However the integrations over momenta can be performed exactly and one is left with the integration over paths in the configuration space only (which is half of the phase space). This is the form which is prefered, as after the integration sign stands the exponential of action, which is a functional of the classical trajectory or field configuration (we can call both path). These paths needn’t solve the equations of motion, so there even isn’t a correspondence path—state.
We experience a classical world. To explain this “away” would be bad. The broadest interpretation of the phrase “many worlds” is that there are many classical worlds equally real to the single world we experience. Surely you accept this. There are questions of how real is this classical world and where it comes from. The decoherence program tries to address this, though I understand it to be incomplete, or at least controversial.
What gets worse when you move to QFT? You seem concerned with what is ontologically fundamental. The classical states are not ontologically fundamental in ordinary QM. If that’s what you mean by MWI...well, you already admitted to being a troll.
I’m not so concerned about fundamental ontology, so I’m happy to talk about QFT as a bunch of ordinary QM systems, one for each reference frame. The decomposition into classical states is not the same in each frame (ie, is not relativistically covariant). Is this a problem? Isn’t the situation of ordinary QM already almost this bad? In ordinary QM, you can give states classical names, but they don’t actually evolve classically. The macroscale classical worlds that do evolve classically are pretty fuzzy.
Surely? I don’t even know what it means. Words “real” and “experience” are close neighbours in my vocabulary, real unexperienced world sounds a lot like an oxymoron, at least if not based on a really strong argument.
Nothing. I have tried to (incompletely of course) explain the relation between the conventional and relativistic Hamiltonian formalism in case of mechanics, where it is slightly more intuitive and simpler. If you address my first remark, you have disinterpreted it. I don’t say that move to QFT isn’t justified, but that one conventional argument used to support this move isn’t good.
It isn’t. By MWI I mean probably the same thing as anybody else. Nothing particularly related to classical states. I have discussed classical states in order to give some background to my intuitions. My statement was that probably the quantum states are a redundant concept.
I would understand that QFT is a bunch of QM systems, one for each spacetime point. I don’t understand what reference frames do with it. In any fixed reference frame QFT has infinite number of degrees of freedom. Maybe you speak about momentum representation? I am confused.
Amen to that. Whenever we cease believing we are working with models and doing phenomenology, and start believing we are dealing with reality and doing ontology; at that point we have stopped doing science and entered the realm of metaphysics.
Be forewarned that my physics is at the “QM and QFT for Dummies” level. But I thought that a slogan of “one Everett world = one Feynman diagram” had some validity. At least if you think of really big diagrams. (>5%)
prase:
How do these people interpret interaction-free measurements? Specifically, let’s observe one of the possible outcomes of the Elitzur-Vaidman bomb-tester thought experiment, namely the one that identifies a working bomb without exploding it. To describe this experiment in Copenhagen terms, we could say that the interaction between the photon wave function and the bomb has, as a measurement, collapsed the photon wave function to the upper arm of the interferometer. Since we actually see this result in the detector, and obtain useful information about the bomb from it, I don’t see how we can deny that the collapse has been observed as an actual process while still insisting on Copenhagen. (But I’m sure there is a way to do it, if there are actual physicists who hold this position.)
This relates to the discussion where you’ve apparently participated, and I am not sure whether I can say more. I am quite content with the prediction of the theory, and don’t trust much the feeling of need of further verbal explanation here. If I were pressed to say something, I would say that probably the present formalism of quantum theory isn’t particularly well suited for human intuition. After all, I believe we will get better formalism in future, whatever it means.
The feeling that the collapse is needed somehow to mediate the bomb’s interaction with the detector falls to the same category with the belief that light must propagate in some medium, or a feeling that there must be some absolute time. Such intuitions are sometimes correct, more often wrong.
Based on my experience, most of the ordinary physicists don’t think interpretations of QM are a big issue. It isn’t discussed too often, people are content to do the calculations most of the time. Of course, this may be different among the first-rank researchers.
Just to clarify: in that discussion, I claimed that the bomb tester thought-experiment doesn’t pose any principal difficulty for Copenhagen relative to the standard variations on the double-slit experiment, so that might seem to contradict what I write here. What I meant to say there is that the main feature of the bomb-tester, namely the interaction-free measurement, is also featured in a less salient way in these classic though-experiments, so that Copenhagen also makes sense for the bomb tester if you accept that it makes sense at all.
But if I may ask, how would you reply to the following statement? “Consider the case when we have a dud bomb, and a case when we have a working bomb that doesn’t explode. There is an observable difference between what the detector shows in these outcomes, so replacing the dud bomb with a working one changed the system in a measurable way. We call this change—whatever exactly it might be—collapse.”
Do you believe that this statement would be flawed, or that it is, after all, somehow compatible with the idea that “the collapse is only a mathematical tool”?
Comparing a system with a dud to a system with a working bomb is comparing two different systems, or the same system in two instances with different initial conditions, and thus doesn’t relate to the collapse. I suppose you rather had in mind a statement: “Consider two experiments with a working bomb, and in one the bomb explodes, while in the second it doesn’t. There is an observable difference...”
Well, it is undeniable that there is a difference. The two systems were the same in the beginning and are different in the end. There are three conventional explanations. 1) The systems were different all way long, but in the beginning the difference was invisible for us (hidden parameters). 2) The difference emerged from a non-deterministic process before or during the measurement (collapse). 3) There is no difference, but we see only a portion of reality after the measurement, and a different one in each of the cases (many worlds).
I suggest fourth point of view: Don’t ask in what state the system is, this is meaningless. Ask only what measurement outcomes are possible, given the outcomes we had from the already performed measurements. If you do that, there is no paradox to solve.
prase:
Actually, that’s the distinction I missed! The notion of “collapse” specifically refers to a non-deterministic process, not to a deterministic process that would at some point reveal the previously existing hidden variables.
That would basically be the “ensemble interpretation,” right? The theory tells you the probability distribution of outcomes, which you’ll see if you repeat the experiment prepared the same way a bunch of times (frequentism!), and that’s all there is to it. I do have a lot of sympathy for that view, as you might guess from the recent discussion of subjective probabilities, though I cannot say that my superficial understanding of QM gives me much confidence in any views I might hold about it.
Well, the quantum probabilities are certainly frequentist. However, I don’t suppose strict Bayesians deny that there are probabilities with frequentist interpretation. I am also not sure about the label ensemble interpretation. It seems that its proponents somehow deny the validity of QM for small, non-ensemblish systems, which is a position I don’t subscribe to. After all, both collapse and many-world interpretations are no more Bayesian and no less frequentist than the ensemble one. The hidden parameters are deterministic, but have their own well known problems.
As for the frequentist-Bayes controversy, although I am probably more than you sympathetic to the Bayesian position, I have some sympathy for frequentism. I think both interpretation can coexist, with different sensible meanings of “probability”.