I thought I’d taken into account the probabilistic burdensomeness of being contrarian with respect to highly intelligent people, but after seeing some of the obviously wrong things here and the corresponding gross overconfidences, I feel considerably less certain.
I don’t know if the fact that actually seeing evidence that I should have expected to see changes my probability-feeling means something profound and important about aliefs vs. beliefs, or if it just means I’m bad at assigning confidence levels.
I thought I’d taken into account the probabilistic burdensomeness of being contrarian with respect to highly intelligent people, but after seeing some of the obviously wrong things here and the corresponding gross overconfidences, I feel considerably less certain.
I don’t know if the fact that actually seeing evidence that I should have expected to see changes my probability-feeling means something profound and important about aliefs vs. beliefs, or if it just means I’m bad at assigning confidence levels.