The more I think about this question, the less certain I am that I know what an answer to it might even look like. What kinds of observations might be evidence one way or the other?
Do people who’ve changed their mind consider themselves to have different values from their past selves? Do we find that when someone has changed their mind, we can explain the relevant values in terms of some “more fundamental” value that’s just being applied to different observations (or different reasoning), or not?
Can we imagine a scenario where an entity with truly different values—the good ol’ paperclip maximizer—is persuaded to change them?
I guess that’s my real point—I wouldn’t even dream of trying to persuade a paperclip maximizer to start valuing human life (except insofar as live humans encourage the production of paperclips) - it values what it values, it doesn’t value what it doesn’t value, what more is there to say? To the extent that I would hope to persuade a medieval person to act more kindly towards animals, it would be because and in terms of the values that they already have, that would likely be mostly shared with mine.
So, if I start out treating animals badly, and then later start treating them kindly, that would be evidence of a pre-existing valuing of animals which was simply being masked by circumstances. Yes?
If I instead start out acting kindly to animals, and then later start treating them badly, is that similarly evidence of a pre-existing lack of valuing-animals which had previously been masked by circumstances? Or does it indicate that my existing, previously manifested, valuing of animals is now being masked by circumstances?
So, if I start out treating animals badly, and then later start treating them kindly, that would be evidence of a pre-existing valuing of animals which was simply being masked by circumstances. Yes?
Either that, or that your present kind-treating of animals is just a manifestation of circumstances, not a true value.
If I instead start out acting kindly to animals, and then later start treating them badly, is that similarly evidence of a pre-existing lack of valuing-animals which had previously been masked by circumstances? Or does it indicate that my existing, previously manifested, valuing of animals is now being masked by circumstances?
Could be either. To figure it out, we’d have to examine those surrounding circumstances and see what underlying values seemed consistent with your actions. Or we could assume that your values would likely be similar to those of other humans—so you probably value the welfare of entities that seem similar to yourself, or potential mates or offspring, and so value animals in proportion to how similar they seem under the circumstances and available information.
The more I think about this question, the less certain I am that I know what an answer to it might even look like.
What kinds of observations might be evidence one way or the other?
Do people who’ve changed their mind consider themselves to have different values from their past selves? Do we find that when someone has changed their mind, we can explain the relevant values in terms of some “more fundamental” value that’s just being applied to different observations (or different reasoning), or not? Can we imagine a scenario where an entity with truly different values—the good ol’ paperclip maximizer—is persuaded to change them?
I guess that’s my real point—I wouldn’t even dream of trying to persuade a paperclip maximizer to start valuing human life (except insofar as live humans encourage the production of paperclips) - it values what it values, it doesn’t value what it doesn’t value, what more is there to say? To the extent that I would hope to persuade a medieval person to act more kindly towards animals, it would be because and in terms of the values that they already have, that would likely be mostly shared with mine.
So, if I start out treating animals badly, and then later start treating them kindly, that would be evidence of a pre-existing valuing of animals which was simply being masked by circumstances. Yes?
If I instead start out acting kindly to animals, and then later start treating them badly, is that similarly evidence of a pre-existing lack of valuing-animals which had previously been masked by circumstances? Or does it indicate that my existing, previously manifested, valuing of animals is now being masked by circumstances?
Either that, or that your present kind-treating of animals is just a manifestation of circumstances, not a true value.
Could be either. To figure it out, we’d have to examine those surrounding circumstances and see what underlying values seemed consistent with your actions. Or we could assume that your values would likely be similar to those of other humans—so you probably value the welfare of entities that seem similar to yourself, or potential mates or offspring, and so value animals in proportion to how similar they seem under the circumstances and available information.
(nods) Fair enough. Thanks for the clarification.