Yeah, Chalmers would agree that adding phenomenal consciousness would be a very profound break with the sort of theory physics currently endorses, and not just because it appears anthromorphizing.
whether that “stuff” that when we introspect we describe with phenomenal concepts must necessarily be described with those concepts (instead of with more sophisticated and less intuitive concepts, for which the zombie/Mary’s Room/etc arguments would fail).
I haven’t yet seen a concept that my phenomenal states appear to fall under, that blocks Mary’s Room or Zombie World. Not even a schematic, partly-fleshed-out concept. (And this is itself very surprising, given physicalism.)
Yeah, Chalmers would agree that adding phenomenal consciousness would be a very profound break with the sort of theory physics currently endorses, and not just because it appears anthromorphizing.
I haven’t yet seen a concept that my phenomenal states appear to fall under, that blocks Mary’s Room or Zombie World. Not even a schematic, partly-fleshed-out concept. (And this is itself very surprising, given physicalism.)