We can construct less intuitive setup. You have created 99 copies of self.
Then every copy gets fake grenade (which always gives $100). Original you get real grenade. After explosion/nonexplosion remaining “you”s are merged. Will you accept next grenade in that setup?
Can I sum it as: if you know that “backup copies” exist then it’s OK to risk being exploded?
Do you care for being backed up in all Everett branches then? Or is it enough to backup in branch where grenade explodes?
The usual idea of a “backup” is that it can be used to restore from if the “original” is lost or damaged. Everett worlds are not “backups” in that sense of the word. If a quantum grenade kills someone, their grieving wife and daughters are not consoled much by the fact that—in other Everett worlds—the bomb did not go off. The supposed “backups” are inaccessible to them.
This apparently has little to do with valuing “extra copies in other quantum branches” though—there is no “Everett merge” procedure.
While for the purposes of this discussion it makes no difference, my understanding is that the “Everett branches” form more of a mesh if you look at them closely. That is, each possible state for a world can be arrived at from many different past states, with some of those states themselves sharing common ancestors.
Yes, entropy considerations make recombining comparatively rare. Much like it’s more likely for an egg to break than to recombine perfectly. Physical interactions being reversible in principle doesn’t mean we should expect to see things reverse themselves all that often. I doubt that we have a substantial disagreement (at least, we don’t if I take your reference to be representative of your position.)
We can construct less intuitive setup. You have created 99 copies of self.
Then every copy gets fake grenade (which always gives $100). Original you get real grenade. After explosion/nonexplosion remaining “you”s are merged. Will you accept next grenade in that setup?
I would be fine with that—assuming that the copies came out with the extra money; that the copying setup was reliable, etc.
This apparently has little to do with valuing “extra copies in other quantum branches” though—there is no “Everett merge” procedure.
Can I sum it as: if you know that “backup copies” exist then it’s OK to risk being exploded? Do you care for being backed up in all Everett branches then? Or is it enough to backup in branch where grenade explodes?
The usual idea of a “backup” is that it can be used to restore from if the “original” is lost or damaged. Everett worlds are not “backups” in that sense of the word. If a quantum grenade kills someone, their grieving wife and daughters are not consoled much by the fact that—in other Everett worlds—the bomb did not go off. The supposed “backups” are inaccessible to them.
Kirk and Scotty would say yes.
While for the purposes of this discussion it makes no difference, my understanding is that the “Everett branches” form more of a mesh if you look at them closely. That is, each possible state for a world can be arrived at from many different past states, with some of those states themselves sharing common ancestors.
Maybe—but that is certainly not the conventional MWI—see:
“Why don’t worlds fuse, as well as split?”
http://www.hedweb.com/manworld.htm#fuse
Yes, entropy considerations make recombining comparatively rare. Much like it’s more likely for an egg to break than to recombine perfectly. Physical interactions being reversible in principle doesn’t mean we should expect to see things reverse themselves all that often. I doubt that we have a substantial disagreement (at least, we don’t if I take your reference to be representative of your position.)