Wanting your identical copies to not be tortured seems to be quintessential timeless decision theory...
If that is the case then I reject it timeless decision theory and await a better one. (It isn’t.)
What I want for identical copies is a mere matter of preference. There are many situations, for example, where I would care not at all whether a simulation of me is being tortured and that simulation doesn’t care either. I don’t even consider that to be a particularly insane preference.
If that is the case then I reject it timeless decision theory and await a better one. (It isn’t.)
What I want for identical copies is a mere matter of preference. There are many situations, for example, where I would care not at all whether a simulation of me is being tortured and that simulation doesn’t care either. I don’t even consider that to be a particularly insane preference.
Do you like being tortured?
No. AND I SAY THE SAME THING AS I PREVIOUSLY DID BUT WITH EMPHASIS. ;)