Interesting. You seem to be saying that if the laws of physics appeared to be nondeterministic, there would be no way to be sure they don’t actually create copies instead.
I think this is correct, with the caveat that the laws of physics for this universe do not appear to work that way. However, the map is not the territory—not knowing how the laws work does not mean there is no fact of how they work. Even so, assuming that the rational course action differs between these situations, the best you can do is assign a prior to both (Solomonoff prior will do, I suppose), and average your actions in some way between them.
It’s possible you’re also correct that, in that case, there would be no fact of the matter about it—I’m not quite sure what you meant. If there are multiple universes (with different laws of physics), and clones in other universes count, then indexical uncertainty about which universe you’re in translates directly into, in effect, existing in both. I think.
Interesting. You seem to be saying that if the laws of physics appeared to be nondeterministic, there would be no way to be sure they don’t actually create copies instead.
I think this is correct, with the caveat that the laws of physics for this universe do not appear to work that way. However, the map is not the territory—not knowing how the laws work does not mean there is no fact of how they work. Even so, assuming that the rational course action differs between these situations, the best you can do is assign a prior to both (Solomonoff prior will do, I suppose), and average your actions in some way between them.
It’s possible you’re also correct that, in that case, there would be no fact of the matter about it—I’m not quite sure what you meant. If there are multiple universes (with different laws of physics), and clones in other universes count, then indexical uncertainty about which universe you’re in translates directly into, in effect, existing in both. I think.
I’m still confused about this, I’ll admit.