Before you open your eyes, you can’t know if you copy or original, but it is not experience of being both, because physical states of both brains at this point are identical to state of brain that wasn’t copied at all. After you open your eyes you will find youself being either copy or original, but again not both by obvious reason.
Again, what point are you actually trying to make here?
It is not true if subjective experience isn’t ontologically fundamental. As existense of e.g. paricular kind of Boltzmann brain seem in that case sufficient for continuation of subjective experience (very unpleasant experience in this case).
A continuation of subjective experience after death is an afterlife.
Again, what point are you actually trying to make here?
A continuation of subjective experience after death is an afterlife.
Did you read “Anthropic trilemma”? I am trying to
Convince someone that Eliezer Yudkowsky wasn’t that confused, or at least that he had a reason to be.
Check if I am wrong and there is satisfactory answer to trilemma, or that the question “What I will experience next?” has no meaning/doesn’t matter.
As far as know word afterlife implles dualism, which is not the case here.