Nope. Because so far everything you’ve said seems perfectly compatible with “something like objective truth”.
I appreciate that you consider yourself to be denying that any such thing is possible—which is why I am interested in finding out exactly what it is you’re claiming, and whether your disagreement with the seekers after objective truth is about more than terminology.
I appreciate that you consider yourself to be denying that any such thing is possible—which is why I am interested in finding out exactly what it is you’re claiming, and whether your disagreement with the seekers after objective truth is about more than terminology.
I certainly do make real life decision based on my views that I wouldn’t make if I would seek objective truth.
When making Anki cards, every one of my cards explicitly states the context in which a statement stands. Creating Anki cards forces you to think very hard about statements and how they can be true or false.
A dark force haunts much of what is most admirable in the philosophy of the last
one hundred years. It consists, briefly put, in the doctrine to the effect that one can
arrive at a correct ontology by paying attention to certain superficial (syntactic)
features of first-order predicate logic as conceived by Frege and Russell. More
specifically, fantology is a doctrine to the effect that the key to the ontological
structure of reality is captured syntactically in the ‘Fa’ (or, in more sophisticated
versions, in the ‘Rab’) of first-order logic, where ‘F’ stands for what is general in
reality and ‘a’ for what is individual.
every one of my cards explicitly states the context in which a statement stands.
Again, perfectly consistent with holding that meaning rather than truth is context-dependent.
And, again, I appreciate that you would say (T) “Truth is context-dependent” rather than (M) “Meaning is context-dependent”. What I’m trying to grasp is (1) whether you mean by (T) more than someone else might mean by (M) and (2) whether your reasons for holding (T) are good reasons for holding (T) rather than (M).
against Fantology
This doesn’t seem to me to have much to do with whether there are objective truths; it’s about what sort of things, and relationships between things, and qualities, and so forth, there are. Holding that some truths aren’t well expressible in terms of first-order predicate calculus isn’t the same thing as holding that there are no truths.
If you at most people’s Anki cards they don’t contain explicit references to context. There are reasons why that’s the case. It comes from the way those people think about the nature of knowledge.
Holding that some truths aren’t well expressible in terms of first-order predicate calculus isn’t the same thing as holding that there are no truths.
I haven’t said that there are no truths but that truths are context dependent. On of the issues of first-order predicate calculus is that it doesn’t contain information about context.
Nope. Because so far everything you’ve said seems perfectly compatible with “something like objective truth”.
I appreciate that you consider yourself to be denying that any such thing is possible—which is why I am interested in finding out exactly what it is you’re claiming, and whether your disagreement with the seekers after objective truth is about more than terminology.
I certainly do make real life decision based on my views that I wouldn’t make if I would seek objective truth. When making Anki cards, every one of my cards explicitly states the context in which a statement stands. Creating Anki cards forces you to think very hard about statements and how they can be true or false.
Barry Smith against Fantology might also be worth reading.
Again, perfectly consistent with holding that meaning rather than truth is context-dependent.
And, again, I appreciate that you would say (T) “Truth is context-dependent” rather than (M) “Meaning is context-dependent”. What I’m trying to grasp is (1) whether you mean by (T) more than someone else might mean by (M) and (2) whether your reasons for holding (T) are good reasons for holding (T) rather than (M).
This doesn’t seem to me to have much to do with whether there are objective truths; it’s about what sort of things, and relationships between things, and qualities, and so forth, there are. Holding that some truths aren’t well expressible in terms of first-order predicate calculus isn’t the same thing as holding that there are no truths.
If you at most people’s Anki cards they don’t contain explicit references to context. There are reasons why that’s the case. It comes from the way those people think about the nature of knowledge.
I haven’t said that there are no truths but that truths are context dependent. On of the issues of first-order predicate calculus is that it doesn’t contain information about context.