I think that my objection is that the analysis sneaks in an ontological assumption: sensory experiences are comparable across a huge range. I’m not very sure that’s true.
I’m not sure what you mean. Are you saying that since torture will destroy someone’s mind, it’s vastly worse than a dust speck, and exactly how much worse is nigh impossible to tell?
It can’t be that hard to tell. Maybe you’re not sure whether or not it’s in the range of ten thousand dust specks to a quintillion dust specks, but it seems absurd to be so confused about it that you don’t even know if it’s worse than 3^^^3 dust specks.
I think that my objection is that the analysis sneaks in an ontological assumption: sensory experiences are comparable across a huge range. I’m not very sure that’s true.
What does it mean for something to be incomparable? You can’t just not decide.
Sensory experiences that reliably change utility functions are hard to reason about.
I’m not sure what you mean. Are you saying that since torture will destroy someone’s mind, it’s vastly worse than a dust speck, and exactly how much worse is nigh impossible to tell?
It can’t be that hard to tell. Maybe you’re not sure whether or not it’s in the range of ten thousand dust specks to a quintillion dust specks, but it seems absurd to be so confused about it that you don’t even know if it’s worse than 3^^^3 dust specks.