Thinking about this game-theoretically:
Let’s say you get awarded points for getting what you want (+10), subtracted points when a Guesser refuses your request and is miffed that you even asked (-10) and you get no points (+0) if you don’t ask, or if you get a friendly refusal from an Asker.
Askers always ask; guessers decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether or not to ask. In principle, this means guessing ought to dominate as a strategy.
On the other hand, in real life, Askers probably are less upset than Guessers by rejection in general. Even when an Asker asks a Guesser and gets an angry refusal, he’s probably less bothered by it than he would be if he were a Guesser. So it’s probably in your best interest to cultivate the flexibility of a Guesser but the unflappability of an Asker.
Also, obviously, a world full of Guessers is riskier than a world full of Askers—every time you ask a favor, you risk that (-10) disaster. So, in a world full of guessers, if they’re risk-averse, nobody ever asks for anything. The expected value for everyone is zero. In a world full of askers, the expected value is positive. I’d rather live there!
The ideal world is where everyone is an asker; however, in a world with some guessers, it may be optimal to be a guesser.
I believe to be an asker asking with innuendo is always ideal.
You can ask normally or with innuendo. The other person can accept or not. If getting rejected is bad then you get 50% to have a bad output when simply asking(-10). When you use innuendo, then there is no real rejection, hence no bad feelings (0). The rest of the time, you get what you asked for (+10).
It’s probably worth mentioning that Guessers also have negative utility from refusing others requests, coming from a culture where requests are generally accepted. If the actors are ethical, then this gives a preference towards guessing.
In particular, you can imagine strategy where an unethical Asker is skilled at pitching requests such that the cost to a Guesser is greater than the gain for the Asker, but less than the Guessers penalty for refusing. By doing this the Asker “coerces” Guessers into agreeing.
Recognising this, an ethical agent in a society of mostly Guessers will likely also take a Guessing strategy.
Thinking about this game-theoretically: Let’s say you get awarded points for getting what you want (+10), subtracted points when a Guesser refuses your request and is miffed that you even asked (-10) and you get no points (+0) if you don’t ask, or if you get a friendly refusal from an Asker.
Askers always ask; guessers decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether or not to ask. In principle, this means guessing ought to dominate as a strategy.
On the other hand, in real life, Askers probably are less upset than Guessers by rejection in general. Even when an Asker asks a Guesser and gets an angry refusal, he’s probably less bothered by it than he would be if he were a Guesser. So it’s probably in your best interest to cultivate the flexibility of a Guesser but the unflappability of an Asker.
Also, obviously, a world full of Guessers is riskier than a world full of Askers—every time you ask a favor, you risk that (-10) disaster. So, in a world full of guessers, if they’re risk-averse, nobody ever asks for anything. The expected value for everyone is zero. In a world full of askers, the expected value is positive. I’d rather live there!
The ideal world is where everyone is an asker; however, in a world with some guessers, it may be optimal to be a guesser.
I believe to be an asker asking with innuendo is always ideal.
You can ask normally or with innuendo. The other person can accept or not. If getting rejected is bad then you get 50% to have a bad output when simply asking(-10). When you use innuendo, then there is no real rejection, hence no bad feelings (0). The rest of the time, you get what you asked for (+10).
It’s probably worth mentioning that Guessers also have negative utility from refusing others requests, coming from a culture where requests are generally accepted. If the actors are ethical, then this gives a preference towards guessing. In particular, you can imagine strategy where an unethical Asker is skilled at pitching requests such that the cost to a Guesser is greater than the gain for the Asker, but less than the Guessers penalty for refusing. By doing this the Asker “coerces” Guessers into agreeing. Recognising this, an ethical agent in a society of mostly Guessers will likely also take a Guessing strategy.