That is a weird way you think it reflects on the content. I think I can fruitfully engage in truth evaluation of grue things wihtout agreeing or supposing that grue is fitting.
Maybe a bigger example would be that we can do quantum mechanics without really understanding the mathematics. The field of interpretations of quantum mechanics is underdeveloped. Understanding there is not a prerequisite to build tech on it or to verify the outcomes of experiments. I think there was a deveoplement stage where we knew there were statistical regularities and the fittingness of the field went forward when the concept of “entanglement” was used to get a handle on it. Understanding helps in being and getting correct and it is the primary path and approach of some but it is not a rerequisite in that its neglect would lead to failure.
I think I can fruitfully engage in truth evaluation of grue things wihtout agreeing or supposing that grue is fitting.
As indicated in the post, fittingness is dependent on the domain D under study. If we take grue to be a term in the study of colour, it is profoundly ill-fitting. I think it is a fair assessment that no researcher who studies colour would find it fruitful or salient to evaluate the truth of propositions involving grue. The picture changes however if we let D be philosophy of science. In that case, grue is fitting, precisely because it illuminates an important paradox in our theories of induction. Here the truth evaluation of statements formulated using grue is fruitful, but that’s not a problem because grue is fitting.
A true counter example to my claim would require that a concept C is ill-fitting for a given domain D and yet it is fruitful (for the purpose of rational inquiry into D) to evaluate the truth of statements which are formulated with C.
Regarding the quantum mechanics example, I would need more details to fully understand your claim. My hunch is that the mathematical concepts used to formulate QM could be fitting for the domain of physics even if we don’t have a good meta-interpretation of them. If you think this isn’t the case, please elaborate on why not.
In my head it is fuzzy whether fittigness is supposed to be the same or different as some concepts being in fashion.
I think it is possible to dedtermine the truth of statements which use grue as a concept to deal with color. “Grue is a shade of red” is a statement in the domain of color and it can be determined to be false. That grue isn’t very fitting for color is connected to phenomena like statements like “Is grue a shade of green?” which is not effectively or truthfully answered with a plain yes or no answer. But I think this has a correct answer and the truth can be evaluated. Grue can feel discontinous if explained in terms of green and blue, but a representation of green can be given in the grue-style color understanding which would make green the “ill-fitting one” for that concept group.
I feel like “fruitful” in this context has multiple possible meaning that might be relevant. One of them is “bears fruit” ie you can make something happen with it, it produces theorems, or other result-type objects. Another would be fruitful in the sense of inciting excitement in the field forward or getting the acceptance of the group. In this sense heliocentrism would be unfruitful in a world of strong catholic geocentrism. In contrast epicycles would be a symptom of fudging, making an ill-fitting theory make correct predictions.
The whole motto of “shut up and calculate” seems to suggest a direction where constructing narratives is seen as anti-progress or just leading people astray. One could think that biology could suffer in a same kind of thing where if people antropomorphise and attribute human like wants and needs to evolutionary pressures then incorrect results could be doled out. But it seems the concepts surrounding biology are able to push forward without undue drag from other concepts. However difference between “inclusive genetic fitness” and “every animal just tries really hard to survive and some succeed” seems like it needs to be done again and again in popularizations. But like grue statements can be examined, examining a really biology ill-fitting overtly-machivellian view of evolution can be done. Then things like “every animal tries to survive” turns into a falsehood through not all animals representing to themselfs their survival making them impossible to want to survive.
Under certain conceptions of fruitfullness it would seem that if somebody achieved an interesting or important result via some method even if the method was obscure before then by the fact of the importance of the discovery the method would become fitting. This would seem like it is so resistant to counter-examples that the concept becomes empty by proving too much.
Suppose that somebody asks “Did the witch board the train?” and I believe that “witch” refers to Rebecca and I infact in my believe Rebecca did step into the train. If I say “yes” to the question do I implicitly think that referring to rebecca as “the witch” is a good idea? A more socially smart answer would probably be that “Rebecca is not a witch, she did board the train”. But even if I do so I have answered the question that I think is ill-fittingly asked. But one doesn’t need to share or agree to the conception to be interoperable or able to cooperate. Refusing or not being able to make the connection is epistemologically suboptimal.
Thanks, you are correct. I have updated the post to reflect this.
That is a weird way you think it reflects on the content. I think I can fruitfully engage in truth evaluation of grue things wihtout agreeing or supposing that grue is fitting.
Maybe a bigger example would be that we can do quantum mechanics without really understanding the mathematics. The field of interpretations of quantum mechanics is underdeveloped. Understanding there is not a prerequisite to build tech on it or to verify the outcomes of experiments. I think there was a deveoplement stage where we knew there were statistical regularities and the fittingness of the field went forward when the concept of “entanglement” was used to get a handle on it. Understanding helps in being and getting correct and it is the primary path and approach of some but it is not a rerequisite in that its neglect would lead to failure.
As indicated in the post, fittingness is dependent on the domain D under study. If we take grue to be a term in the study of colour, it is profoundly ill-fitting. I think it is a fair assessment that no researcher who studies colour would find it fruitful or salient to evaluate the truth of propositions involving grue. The picture changes however if we let D be philosophy of science. In that case, grue is fitting, precisely because it illuminates an important paradox in our theories of induction. Here the truth evaluation of statements formulated using grue is fruitful, but that’s not a problem because grue is fitting.
A true counter example to my claim would require that a concept C is ill-fitting for a given domain D and yet it is fruitful (for the purpose of rational inquiry into D) to evaluate the truth of statements which are formulated with C.
Regarding the quantum mechanics example, I would need more details to fully understand your claim. My hunch is that the mathematical concepts used to formulate QM could be fitting for the domain of physics even if we don’t have a good meta-interpretation of them. If you think this isn’t the case, please elaborate on why not.
In my head it is fuzzy whether fittigness is supposed to be the same or different as some concepts being in fashion.
I think it is possible to dedtermine the truth of statements which use grue as a concept to deal with color. “Grue is a shade of red” is a statement in the domain of color and it can be determined to be false. That grue isn’t very fitting for color is connected to phenomena like statements like “Is grue a shade of green?” which is not effectively or truthfully answered with a plain yes or no answer. But I think this has a correct answer and the truth can be evaluated. Grue can feel discontinous if explained in terms of green and blue, but a representation of green can be given in the grue-style color understanding which would make green the “ill-fitting one” for that concept group.
I feel like “fruitful” in this context has multiple possible meaning that might be relevant. One of them is “bears fruit” ie you can make something happen with it, it produces theorems, or other result-type objects. Another would be fruitful in the sense of inciting excitement in the field forward or getting the acceptance of the group. In this sense heliocentrism would be unfruitful in a world of strong catholic geocentrism. In contrast epicycles would be a symptom of fudging, making an ill-fitting theory make correct predictions.
The whole motto of “shut up and calculate” seems to suggest a direction where constructing narratives is seen as anti-progress or just leading people astray. One could think that biology could suffer in a same kind of thing where if people antropomorphise and attribute human like wants and needs to evolutionary pressures then incorrect results could be doled out. But it seems the concepts surrounding biology are able to push forward without undue drag from other concepts. However difference between “inclusive genetic fitness” and “every animal just tries really hard to survive and some succeed” seems like it needs to be done again and again in popularizations. But like grue statements can be examined, examining a really biology ill-fitting overtly-machivellian view of evolution can be done. Then things like “every animal tries to survive” turns into a falsehood through not all animals representing to themselfs their survival making them impossible to want to survive.
Under certain conceptions of fruitfullness it would seem that if somebody achieved an interesting or important result via some method even if the method was obscure before then by the fact of the importance of the discovery the method would become fitting. This would seem like it is so resistant to counter-examples that the concept becomes empty by proving too much.
Suppose that somebody asks “Did the witch board the train?” and I believe that “witch” refers to Rebecca and I infact in my believe Rebecca did step into the train. If I say “yes” to the question do I implicitly think that referring to rebecca as “the witch” is a good idea? A more socially smart answer would probably be that “Rebecca is not a witch, she did board the train”. But even if I do so I have answered the question that I think is ill-fittingly asked. But one doesn’t need to share or agree to the conception to be interoperable or able to cooperate. Refusing or not being able to make the connection is epistemologically suboptimal.