In my head it is fuzzy whether fittigness is supposed to be the same or different as some concepts being in fashion.
I think it is possible to dedtermine the truth of statements which use grue as a concept to deal with color. “Grue is a shade of red” is a statement in the domain of color and it can be determined to be false. That grue isn’t very fitting for color is connected to phenomena like statements like “Is grue a shade of green?” which is not effectively or truthfully answered with a plain yes or no answer. But I think this has a correct answer and the truth can be evaluated. Grue can feel discontinous if explained in terms of green and blue, but a representation of green can be given in the grue-style color understanding which would make green the “ill-fitting one” for that concept group.
I feel like “fruitful” in this context has multiple possible meaning that might be relevant. One of them is “bears fruit” ie you can make something happen with it, it produces theorems, or other result-type objects. Another would be fruitful in the sense of inciting excitement in the field forward or getting the acceptance of the group. In this sense heliocentrism would be unfruitful in a world of strong catholic geocentrism. In contrast epicycles would be a symptom of fudging, making an ill-fitting theory make correct predictions.
The whole motto of “shut up and calculate” seems to suggest a direction where constructing narratives is seen as anti-progress or just leading people astray. One could think that biology could suffer in a same kind of thing where if people antropomorphise and attribute human like wants and needs to evolutionary pressures then incorrect results could be doled out. But it seems the concepts surrounding biology are able to push forward without undue drag from other concepts. However difference between “inclusive genetic fitness” and “every animal just tries really hard to survive and some succeed” seems like it needs to be done again and again in popularizations. But like grue statements can be examined, examining a really biology ill-fitting overtly-machivellian view of evolution can be done. Then things like “every animal tries to survive” turns into a falsehood through not all animals representing to themselfs their survival making them impossible to want to survive.
Under certain conceptions of fruitfullness it would seem that if somebody achieved an interesting or important result via some method even if the method was obscure before then by the fact of the importance of the discovery the method would become fitting. This would seem like it is so resistant to counter-examples that the concept becomes empty by proving too much.
Suppose that somebody asks “Did the witch board the train?” and I believe that “witch” refers to Rebecca and I infact in my believe Rebecca did step into the train. If I say “yes” to the question do I implicitly think that referring to rebecca as “the witch” is a good idea? A more socially smart answer would probably be that “Rebecca is not a witch, she did board the train”. But even if I do so I have answered the question that I think is ill-fittingly asked. But one doesn’t need to share or agree to the conception to be interoperable or able to cooperate. Refusing or not being able to make the connection is epistemologically suboptimal.
In my head it is fuzzy whether fittigness is supposed to be the same or different as some concepts being in fashion.
I think it is possible to dedtermine the truth of statements which use grue as a concept to deal with color. “Grue is a shade of red” is a statement in the domain of color and it can be determined to be false. That grue isn’t very fitting for color is connected to phenomena like statements like “Is grue a shade of green?” which is not effectively or truthfully answered with a plain yes or no answer. But I think this has a correct answer and the truth can be evaluated. Grue can feel discontinous if explained in terms of green and blue, but a representation of green can be given in the grue-style color understanding which would make green the “ill-fitting one” for that concept group.
I feel like “fruitful” in this context has multiple possible meaning that might be relevant. One of them is “bears fruit” ie you can make something happen with it, it produces theorems, or other result-type objects. Another would be fruitful in the sense of inciting excitement in the field forward or getting the acceptance of the group. In this sense heliocentrism would be unfruitful in a world of strong catholic geocentrism. In contrast epicycles would be a symptom of fudging, making an ill-fitting theory make correct predictions.
The whole motto of “shut up and calculate” seems to suggest a direction where constructing narratives is seen as anti-progress or just leading people astray. One could think that biology could suffer in a same kind of thing where if people antropomorphise and attribute human like wants and needs to evolutionary pressures then incorrect results could be doled out. But it seems the concepts surrounding biology are able to push forward without undue drag from other concepts. However difference between “inclusive genetic fitness” and “every animal just tries really hard to survive and some succeed” seems like it needs to be done again and again in popularizations. But like grue statements can be examined, examining a really biology ill-fitting overtly-machivellian view of evolution can be done. Then things like “every animal tries to survive” turns into a falsehood through not all animals representing to themselfs their survival making them impossible to want to survive.
Under certain conceptions of fruitfullness it would seem that if somebody achieved an interesting or important result via some method even if the method was obscure before then by the fact of the importance of the discovery the method would become fitting. This would seem like it is so resistant to counter-examples that the concept becomes empty by proving too much.
Suppose that somebody asks “Did the witch board the train?” and I believe that “witch” refers to Rebecca and I infact in my believe Rebecca did step into the train. If I say “yes” to the question do I implicitly think that referring to rebecca as “the witch” is a good idea? A more socially smart answer would probably be that “Rebecca is not a witch, she did board the train”. But even if I do so I have answered the question that I think is ill-fittingly asked. But one doesn’t need to share or agree to the conception to be interoperable or able to cooperate. Refusing or not being able to make the connection is epistemologically suboptimal.