Alternate history is not falsifiable, of course, but that scenario doesn’t look all that likely to me. Russia successfully recovered from losing a very large chunk of its territory, a great deal of its army, and most of its manufacturing capacity to Germans in 1941-1942. Losing a few cities (even assuming the bombers could get through—there were no ICBMs and Russia in 1945 had a pretty good air force and AA capabilities) would not cripple Russia. I would guess that it would just incentivize it to roll over the remainder of Europe. It’s not like Stalin ever cared about casualties.
Good point, but I think Bostrom’s point about risk aversion does much to ameliorate it. If the US had had a 50% chance of securing global hegemonicy, and a 50% chance of destruction from such a move, it probably would not have done it. A non-risk-averse, non-deontological AI, on the other hands, with its eye on the light cone, might consider the gamble worthwhile.
Alternate history is not falsifiable, of course, but that scenario doesn’t look all that likely to me. Russia successfully recovered from losing a very large chunk of its territory, a great deal of its army, and most of its manufacturing capacity to Germans in 1941-1942. Losing a few cities (even assuming the bombers could get through—there were no ICBMs and Russia in 1945 had a pretty good air force and AA capabilities) would not cripple Russia. I would guess that it would just incentivize it to roll over the remainder of Europe. It’s not like Stalin ever cared about casualties.
Good point, but I think Bostrom’s point about risk aversion does much to ameliorate it. If the US had had a 50% chance of securing global hegemonicy, and a 50% chance of destruction from such a move, it probably would not have done it. A non-risk-averse, non-deontological AI, on the other hands, with its eye on the light cone, might consider the gamble worthwhile.
Quite right, hard to tell.