“The latter, since there are no Garden of Eden patterns in physics.”
Thank you for your excellent job of communicating (and the GoE link decreased possible ambiguities, too).
How do we know that there are no Garden of Eden patterns? That is a very interesting claim. In attempting to reverse-engineer it, I remembered that according to quantum theory, each wavefunction is nowhere zero. Thus, any collection of particles could tunnel into place over any distance in any organization you could possibly specify. Is that the key to the proof?
At any rate, I’m “sticking to my guns” about many-worlds not affecting the desirability of average utilitarianism. The sum over all direct results of my actions over all worlds is still overwhelmingly determined by already determined macroscopic causes not known to me, NOT by as-yet undetermined quantum decoherences splitting worlds; my probability computations are dominated by unknowns, not by unknowables.
I’m not arguing that average utilitarianism is wrong; I’m just saying that MW doesn’t seem to appreciably affect its desirability.
“The latter, since there are no Garden of Eden patterns in physics.”
Thank you for your excellent job of communicating (and the GoE link decreased possible ambiguities, too).
How do we know that there are no Garden of Eden patterns? That is a very interesting claim. In attempting to reverse-engineer it, I remembered that according to quantum theory, each wavefunction is nowhere zero. Thus, any collection of particles could tunnel into place over any distance in any organization you could possibly specify. Is that the key to the proof?
At any rate, I’m “sticking to my guns” about many-worlds not affecting the desirability of average utilitarianism. The sum over all direct results of my actions over all worlds is still overwhelmingly determined by already determined macroscopic causes not known to me, NOT by as-yet undetermined quantum decoherences splitting worlds; my probability computations are dominated by unknowns, not by unknowables.
I’m not arguing that average utilitarianism is wrong; I’m just saying that MW doesn’t seem to appreciably affect its desirability.