Suppose we lived in a universe before any quantum decoherance tests were done. And now suppose I (as a scientist with a favourite pet personal theory) put forward the theory that multiple parallel universes exist, and start fleshing it out. One of the predictions this theory would make would be in the way entangled photons probabilities change-at-a-distance. Would not performing the test just described and coming up with a set of probabilities that matched the theories predictions be a valid scientific prediction?
If all that can be observed in a system are probabilities, then why does it make sense to say some probability theorem superset’s science—science surely can make testable predictions about probabilities! (unless I’m reading the post incorrectly, the whole argument appears to hinge on sciece not being able to do this)
Also, for further thought, does that imply the order of prediction, and testing matters, when considering if something should be added to the body of evidence that science uses to aggregate ‘rightness’ across individual scientists? (since in this case, the theory was dreamed up after to match up the evidence and not make much in the way of other predictions… Shouldn’t that be evidence that the theory is fairly specifically talking about a very small subset of ‘possibility’ and that the subset it talks about has been tested, and is correct?
Suppose we lived in a universe before any quantum decoherance tests were done. And now suppose I (as a scientist with a favourite pet personal theory) put forward the theory that multiple parallel universes exist, and start fleshing it out. One of the predictions this theory would make would be in the way entangled photons probabilities change-at-a-distance. Would not performing the test just described and coming up with a set of probabilities that matched the theories predictions be a valid scientific prediction?
If all that can be observed in a system are probabilities, then why does it make sense to say some probability theorem superset’s science—science surely can make testable predictions about probabilities! (unless I’m reading the post incorrectly, the whole argument appears to hinge on sciece not being able to do this)
Also, for further thought, does that imply the order of prediction, and testing matters, when considering if something should be added to the body of evidence that science uses to aggregate ‘rightness’ across individual scientists? (since in this case, the theory was dreamed up after to match up the evidence and not make much in the way of other predictions… Shouldn’t that be evidence that the theory is fairly specifically talking about a very small subset of ‘possibility’ and that the subset it talks about has been tested, and is correct?
Anyone?