One thing maybe worth looking at is the attractor set of the CEV process. If the attractor set is small, this means the final outcome is determined more by the CEV process than the initial values.
It seems perfectly plausible to me that there might be many fewer satisfactory endpoints than starting points. In most optimization processes, there’s at most a discrete set of acceptable endpoints, even when there are uncountably infinitely many possible places to start.
Why would it indicate a flaw in CEV if the same turned out to be true there?
One thing maybe worth looking at is the attractor set of the CEV process. If the attractor set is small, this means the final outcome is determined more by the CEV process than the initial values.
Or maybe it means that objective morality exists. You never know :-)
Suppose ten trillion moral starting points, a thousand attractors. Then moral realism is certainly wrong, but the process is clearly flawed.
Really? Why?
It seems perfectly plausible to me that there might be many fewer satisfactory endpoints than starting points. In most optimization processes, there’s at most a discrete set of acceptable endpoints, even when there are uncountably infinitely many possible places to start.
Why would it indicate a flaw in CEV if the same turned out to be true there?
I think his issue is that there are multiple attractors.
I agree, though perhaps morality could be disjunctive.