Right, good point, I think it’s very close. I guess when you are a professional philosopher stating the obvious it often comes across as profound.
Though I’m trying to do more than to just state it, but to construct a model of the meta-problem: that it is a side effect of the specific optimization computation. I wish I could tease out some testable predictions from this model that are different from alternatives.
FWIW, sounds like you’re pointing at what Chalmers calls the meta problem of consciousness: why do we think there is a hard problem of consciousness?
Right, good point, I think it’s very close. I guess when you are a professional philosopher stating the obvious it often comes across as profound.
Though I’m trying to do more than to just state it, but to construct a model of the meta-problem: that it is a side effect of the specific optimization computation. I wish I could tease out some testable predictions from this model that are different from alternatives.