Here, EY discusses the concept of a non-person predicate, which evaluates things and tells you if they are not-people. It it says it’s a person, it might be wrong, but it’s never wrong if it says it’s not a person. That way, if you get “not a person!”, you can be certain that you do not have to worry about its subjective experience (and therefore, for many moral theories, its moral patienthood).
This doesn’t affect the main post’s point that once we know which systems are conscious, we may find ourselves in a situation where all our best candidates for work-doing-systems are also consciousness-having-systems
Related: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/wqDRRx9RqwKLzWt7R/nonperson-predicates
Here, EY discusses the concept of a non-person predicate, which evaluates things and tells you if they are not-people. It it says it’s a person, it might be wrong, but it’s never wrong if it says it’s not a person. That way, if you get “not a person!”, you can be certain that you do not have to worry about its subjective experience (and therefore, for many moral theories, its moral patienthood).
This doesn’t affect the main post’s point that once we know which systems are conscious, we may find ourselves in a situation where all our best candidates for work-doing-systems are also consciousness-having-systems
Also related: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/mELQFMi9egPn5EAjK/my-attempt-to-explain-looking-insight-meditation-and
Here Kaj Sotala suggests that an aspect of our qualitative experience (suffering) can be removed without much change in our behaviours. (Though I worry that makes our experience of suffering surprising)