(Epistemic status: Plausible position that I don’t actually believe in.) The correct answer to the leg-cutting dilemma is that you shouldn’t cut it, because actually you will end up existing no matter what because Omega has to simulate you to predict your actions, and it’s always possible that you’re in the simulation. The fact that you always have to be simulated to be predicted makes up for every apparent decision theory paradox, such as not cutting your leg off even when doing so precludes your existence.
The simulation might be a zombie, though. Ie. you don’t consciously exist. Arguments against p zombies don’t apply here, because computer simulations aren’t physical duplicates.
(Epistemic status: Plausible position that I don’t actually believe in.) The correct answer to the leg-cutting dilemma is that you shouldn’t cut it, because actually you will end up existing no matter what because Omega has to simulate you to predict your actions, and it’s always possible that you’re in the simulation. The fact that you always have to be simulated to be predicted makes up for every apparent decision theory paradox, such as not cutting your leg off even when doing so precludes your existence.
The simulation might be a zombie, though. Ie. you don’t consciously exist. Arguments against p zombies don’t apply here, because computer simulations aren’t physical duplicates.