I don’t think the quoted problem has that structure.
And suppose that the existence of S tends to cause both (i) one-boxing tendencies and (ii) whether there’s money in the opaque box or not when decision-makers face Newcomb problems.
But now suppose that the pathway by which S causes there to be money in the opaque box or not is that another agent looks at S
So S causes one boxing tendencies, and the person putting money in the box looks only at S.
So it seems to be changing the problem to say that the predictor observes your brain/your decision procedure. When all they observe is S which, while causing “one boxing tendencies”, is not causally downstream of your decision theory.
Further if S where downstream of your decision procedure, then fdt one boxes whether or not the path from the decision procedure to the contents of the boxes routes through an agent. Undermining the criticism that fst has implausible discontinuities.
I don’t think the quoted problem has that structure.
So S causes one boxing tendencies, and the person putting money in the box looks only at S.
So it seems to be changing the problem to say that the predictor observes your brain/your decision procedure. When all they observe is S which, while causing “one boxing tendencies”, is not causally downstream of your decision theory.
Further if S where downstream of your decision procedure, then fdt one boxes whether or not the path from the decision procedure to the contents of the boxes routes through an agent. Undermining the criticism that fst has implausible discontinuities.