I hope it is okay for me to reply to all these. Right, yes, that is my position steven. When the interpreter algorithm length hits the length of the algorithm it is finding, nothing of any import happened. Would we seriously say, for example, that a mind corresponding to a 10^21 bit computer program would be fine, any enjoying a conscious existence, if it was “findable” by a 10^21 bit program, but would suddenly cease to exist if it was findable by only a 10^21+1 bit program? I would say, no. However, I can understand that that is always how people see it. For some reason, the point at which one algorithmic length exceeds the other is the point at which people think things are going too far.
Thanks for joining the discussion, PaulUK/Paul Almond. (I’ll refer to you with the former.)
Would we seriously say, for example, that a mind corresponding to a 10^21 bit computer program would be fine, any enjoying a conscious existence, if it was “findable” by a 10^21 bit program, but would suddenly cease to exist if it was findable by only a 10^21+1 bit program? I would say, no.
Well, then I’m going to apply Occam’s razor back onto this. If you require a 10^21+1 bit program to extract a known 10^21 bit program, we should prefer the explanation:
a) “You wrote a program one bit too long.”
rather than,
b) “You found a naturally occurring instance of a 10^21 bit algorithm that just happens to need a 10^21+1 bit algorithm in order to map it to the known 10^21 bit algorithm.”
See the problem?
The whole point of explaining a phenomenon as implementing an algorithm is that, given the phenomenon, we don’t need to do the whole algorithm separately. What if I sold you a “computer” with the proviso that “you have to manually check each answer it gives you”?
Either name is fine (since it is hardly a secret who I am here).
Yes, I see the problem, but this was very much in my mind when I wrote all this. I could have hardly missed the issue. I would have to accept it or deny it, and in fact I considered it a great deal. It is the first thing you would need to consider. I still maintain that there is nothing special about this algorithm length. I actually think your practical example of buying the computer, if anything counts against it. Suppose you sold me a computer and it “allegedly” ran a program 10^21 bits long, but I had to use another computer running a program that was (10^21)+1 bits long to analyze what it was doing and get any useful output. Would I want my money back? Of course I would. However, I would also want my money back if I needed a (10^21)-1 bit program to analyze the computer – and so would you. As a consumer, the thing would be practically useless anyway. In one case I am having to do all the computers job, and a tiny bit more, just to get any output. In the other case I am having to do a tiny bit less than the computer’s job to get any output: it would hardly make a practical difference. There is no sudden point at which I would want my money back: I would want it back long before we got near 10^21 bits. Can you show that 10^21 bits is special? I would say that to have it as special you pretty much have to postulate it and I want to work with a minimum of postulates: it is my whole approach, though it causes some conclusions I hardly find comfortable.
You have mentioned Occam’s razor, but we may disagree on how it should be applied. What Occam originally said was probably too vague to help much in these matters, so we should go with what seems a reasonable “modernization” of Occam’s razor. I do not think Occam’s razor tells us to reduce the amount of stuff we accept. Rather, I think it tells us to reduce the amount of stuff we accept as intrinsically existing. I would not, for example, regarding Occam’s razor as arguing against the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, as many people would. I would say that Occam’s razor would argue against having some arbitrary wavefunction collapse mechanism if we need not assume one.
I would also say, as well, that this does not resolve the issue of combining computers and probability that I raised in the first article. My intention was to put a number of such issues together and show that we needing to do the sort of thing I said to get round difficult issues.
I hope it is okay for me to reply to all these. Right, yes, that is my position steven. When the interpreter algorithm length hits the length of the algorithm it is finding, nothing of any import happened. Would we seriously say, for example, that a mind corresponding to a 10^21 bit computer program would be fine, any enjoying a conscious existence, if it was “findable” by a 10^21 bit program, but would suddenly cease to exist if it was findable by only a 10^21+1 bit program? I would say, no. However, I can understand that that is always how people see it. For some reason, the point at which one algorithmic length exceeds the other is the point at which people think things are going too far.
Thanks for joining the discussion, PaulUK/Paul Almond. (I’ll refer to you with the former.)
Well, then I’m going to apply Occam’s razor back onto this. If you require a 10^21+1 bit program to extract a known 10^21 bit program, we should prefer the explanation:
a) “You wrote a program one bit too long.”
rather than,
b) “You found a naturally occurring instance of a 10^21 bit algorithm that just happens to need a 10^21+1 bit algorithm in order to map it to the known 10^21 bit algorithm.”
See the problem?
The whole point of explaining a phenomenon as implementing an algorithm is that, given the phenomenon, we don’t need to do the whole algorithm separately. What if I sold you a “computer” with the proviso that “you have to manually check each answer it gives you”?
Either name is fine (since it is hardly a secret who I am here).
Yes, I see the problem, but this was very much in my mind when I wrote all this. I could have hardly missed the issue. I would have to accept it or deny it, and in fact I considered it a great deal. It is the first thing you would need to consider. I still maintain that there is nothing special about this algorithm length. I actually think your practical example of buying the computer, if anything counts against it. Suppose you sold me a computer and it “allegedly” ran a program 10^21 bits long, but I had to use another computer running a program that was (10^21)+1 bits long to analyze what it was doing and get any useful output. Would I want my money back? Of course I would. However, I would also want my money back if I needed a (10^21)-1 bit program to analyze the computer – and so would you. As a consumer, the thing would be practically useless anyway. In one case I am having to do all the computers job, and a tiny bit more, just to get any output. In the other case I am having to do a tiny bit less than the computer’s job to get any output: it would hardly make a practical difference. There is no sudden point at which I would want my money back: I would want it back long before we got near 10^21 bits. Can you show that 10^21 bits is special? I would say that to have it as special you pretty much have to postulate it and I want to work with a minimum of postulates: it is my whole approach, though it causes some conclusions I hardly find comfortable.
You have mentioned Occam’s razor, but we may disagree on how it should be applied. What Occam originally said was probably too vague to help much in these matters, so we should go with what seems a reasonable “modernization” of Occam’s razor. I do not think Occam’s razor tells us to reduce the amount of stuff we accept. Rather, I think it tells us to reduce the amount of stuff we accept as intrinsically existing. I would not, for example, regarding Occam’s razor as arguing against the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, as many people would. I would say that Occam’s razor would argue against having some arbitrary wavefunction collapse mechanism if we need not assume one.
I would also say, as well, that this does not resolve the issue of combining computers and probability that I raised in the first article. My intention was to put a number of such issues together and show that we needing to do the sort of thing I said to get round difficult issues.