Not exactly. First, I can predict that if I throw the stone it will fall down and stuff like that. A miracle may happen, but the probability for it to happen from nowhere is very small (also not zero).
OK, so when things behave as normally expected, that’s just laws of nature, but whenever you’re surprised we can blame it on the witch?
So, first, such theory can predict something (like myrrh-streaming icon mentioned above, or healing, or answer to the prayers). Second, the predictions do not always coincide with no God theory predictions
This point is very important: The theory must make predictions to be knowledge—if your theory is equally good at explaining anything (like the witch), then you have zero knowledge, because it fails to constrain anticipation.
the [advance] expectation of the posterior probability, after viewing the evidence, must equal the prior probability. … If you expect a strong probability of seeing weak evidence in one direction, it must be balanced by a weak expectation of seeing strong evidence in the other direction. If you’re very confident in your theory, and therefore anticipate seeing an outcome that matches your hypothesis, this can only provide a very small increment to your belief (it is already close to 1); but the unexpected failure of your prediction would (and must) deal your confidence a huge blow.
In other words, how strong a piece of evidence should appear to you, depends on your priors; strength is not a property of the evidence alone. If you are claiming that your God hypothesis is not equally good at explaining anything (like the witch), and if you are (rationally) very confident that God exists, then you must have a weak expectation of seeing strong evidence the other way. That’s a crux, right? What would be a big surprise to your theory?
This point is very important: The theory must make predictions to be knowledge—if your theory is equally good at explaining anything (like the witch), then you have zero knowledge, because it fails to constrain anticipation
“Laws of nature do not hold 100%” is a prediction. That’s why atheists feel it necessary to argue against miracles.
Well, my expectations would decrease if some of the miracles I believe would be proven to be fakes or natural events. The miracles that I believe are not those that people believe locally, but those that the Church recognizes globally—usually they send a special commission to check if it is indeed miracle or just natural event (or fake). I would say, I put high probability that the miracles that was approved by this commission are indeed miracles, and if you demonstrate me that they are not it would decrease my probability. The miracles I can name:
-different myrrh-streaming icons, as long as it passed the check by church officials not only on the local level
-witnesses that are collecting for the canonization of saints. Each time when new person is canonized one of the main criteria is whether there are miracles by prayers to him. So it is quite large data of different witnesses. Most of them can be explained by coincidence or natural effects, however, there are more difficult witnesses such as very fast curing from disease that by doctor prognosis should have taken few orders of magnitude longer time (or should not have happen at all).
-relics of saints. In some cases (quite often actually) when after long time the body of the dead person who is considered to be saint is taken back from the ground, it discovered to be not decomposed. It is not necessary condition—there are many saints who does not have it. However, it is interesting question, whether this effect is more often among saints that among usual people (taking into account only the cases when relics were taken from the ground after canonization, to exclude the bias). If it is indeed significantly more often, what can be the reason? Why would the situation be opposite on mount Athos, where non-decomposition of the body is considered to be a bad thing?
OK, so when things behave as normally expected, that’s just laws of nature, but whenever you’re surprised we can blame it on the witch?
This point is very important: The theory must make predictions to be knowledge—if your theory is equally good at explaining anything (like the witch), then you have zero knowledge, because it fails to constrain anticipation.
The sword of prediction cuts both ways:
In other words, how strong a piece of evidence should appear to you, depends on your priors; strength is not a property of the evidence alone. If you are claiming that your God hypothesis is not equally good at explaining anything (like the witch), and if you are (rationally) very confident that God exists, then you must have a weak expectation of seeing strong evidence the other way. That’s a crux, right? What would be a big surprise to your theory?
A corollary to conservation of evidence: Absence of evidence is evidence of absence, when the observation would be expected.
“Laws of nature do not hold 100%” is a prediction. That’s why atheists feel it necessary to argue against miracles.
Well, my expectations would decrease if some of the miracles I believe would be proven to be fakes or natural events. The miracles that I believe are not those that people believe locally, but those that the Church recognizes globally—usually they send a special commission to check if it is indeed miracle or just natural event (or fake). I would say, I put high probability that the miracles that was approved by this commission are indeed miracles, and if you demonstrate me that they are not it would decrease my probability. The miracles I can name:
-different myrrh-streaming icons, as long as it passed the check by church officials not only on the local level
-witnesses that are collecting for the canonization of saints. Each time when new person is canonized one of the main criteria is whether there are miracles by prayers to him. So it is quite large data of different witnesses. Most of them can be explained by coincidence or natural effects, however, there are more difficult witnesses such as very fast curing from disease that by doctor prognosis should have taken few orders of magnitude longer time (or should not have happen at all).
-relics of saints. In some cases (quite often actually) when after long time the body of the dead person who is considered to be saint is taken back from the ground, it discovered to be not decomposed. It is not necessary condition—there are many saints who does not have it. However, it is interesting question, whether this effect is more often among saints that among usual people (taking into account only the cases when relics were taken from the ground after canonization, to exclude the bias). If it is indeed significantly more often, what can be the reason? Why would the situation be opposite on mount Athos, where non-decomposition of the body is considered to be a bad thing?