Recently I’ve been exploring moral philosophy with a series on Moral Licensing, Andrew Tane Glen’s Why Cooperate?, and in a workshop I ran with my daughter’s class about the strategies of cooperation and defection. One phenomenon that has arisen through these explorations is that defectors generally gain a short term relative advantage, while cooperators benefit from a sustained long term absolute advantage, which got me thinking about a simulation.
Unfortunately I can’t embed the simulation here so to view it you’ll need to visit the site. But I’m interested in what people think of the concept, and the practice of using simulations in general to illustrate these sorts of concepts.
Do you think this sort of short term individualism and long term cooperation, is something that applies outside the prisoner’s dilemma?
Capitalising On Trust—A Simulation
Link post
Recently I’ve been exploring moral philosophy with a series on Moral Licensing, Andrew Tane Glen’s Why Cooperate?, and in a workshop I ran with my daughter’s class about the strategies of cooperation and defection. One phenomenon that has arisen through these explorations is that defectors generally gain a short term relative advantage, while cooperators benefit from a sustained long term absolute advantage, which got me thinking about a simulation.
Unfortunately I can’t embed the simulation here so to view it you’ll need to visit the site. But I’m interested in what people think of the concept, and the practice of using simulations in general to illustrate these sorts of concepts.
Do you think this sort of short term individualism and long term cooperation, is something that applies outside the prisoner’s dilemma?