Illusionism thinks the illusion-of-phenomenal-consciousness is ‘perception-like’ — it’s more like seeing an optical illusion, and less like just having a stubborn hunch that won’t go away even though there’s no apparent perceptual basis for it.
The view you’re describing is different from illusionism, and is more like the one articulated by Dennett for most of his career. E.g., Dennett’s 1979 “On the absence of phenomenology”:
[...] Since I hold that we have privileged access only to judgments, and since I cannot make sense of any claim to the effect that something to which I do not have privileged access is an element of my immediate conscious experience, I am left defending the view that such judgments exhaust our immediate consciousness, that our individual streams of consciousness consist of nothing but such propositional episodes, or better: that such streams of consciousness, composed exclusively of such propositional episodes, are the reality that inspires the variety of misdescriptions that pass for theories of consciousness, both homegrown and academic.
[...] You may be wondering if you even have judgments. Typically these episodes are the momentary, wordless thinkings or convictions (sometimes misleadingly called conscious or episodic beliefs) that are often supposed to be the executive bridges leading to our public, worded introspective reports from our perusal or enjoyment of the phenomenological manifold our reports are about. My view, put bluntly, is that there is no phenomenological manifold in any such relation to our reports. There are the public reports we issue, and then there are episodes of our propositional awareness, our judgments, and then there is—so far as introspection is concerned—darkness. What lies beyond or on the interior of our judgments of the moment, what grounds or causes or controls them, is wholly a matter for science or speculation—in any event it is not a matter to which we have any privileged access at all.
Or his 1991 Consciousness Explained:
[...] You seem to think there’s a difference between thinking (judging, deciding, being of the heartfelt opinion that) something seems pink to you and something really seeming pink to you. But there is no difference.
There is no such phenomenon as really seeming – over and above the phenomenon of judging in one way or another that something is the case.
Indeed, Dennett describes non-physicalism as being based on a “hunch”, as though it were just a nagging hard-to-pin-down belief and not something that feels palpably present in all experience. This seems very weird to me.
These days I believe Dennett endorses illusionism instead, though I’m not sure what changed his mind if so? And I have to wonder whether he has some aphantasia-like condition that made a view as weird as delusionism appealing.
Illusionism thinks the illusion-of-phenomenal-consciousness is ‘perception-like’ — it’s more like seeing an optical illusion, and less like just having a stubborn hunch that won’t go away even though there’s no apparent perceptual basis for
If you say so, but it doesn’t make it any easier to believe!
Indeed, Dennett describes non-physicalism as being based on a “hunch”, as though it were just a nagging hard-to-pin-down belief and not something that feels palpably present in all experience
It’s not clear that it’s a hunch , and it’s not clear that it’s a palpable presence. Physics is a complicated subject that most people do not understand , so why would anyone have reliable hunches or introspections about non physicallity? And the phenomenology varies anyway...some people, but nobody here, have the intuition that thought is non physical.
And I have to wonder whether he has some aphantasia-like condition that made a view as weird as delusionism appealing.
Dennetts phenomenonology is a mystery. Maybe it’s like one of those early computer games that prints out “you see a fire breathing dragon”.
Illusionism thinks the illusion-of-phenomenal-consciousness is ‘perception-like’ — it’s more like seeing an optical illusion, and less like just having a stubborn hunch that won’t go away even though there’s no apparent perceptual basis for it.
The view you’re describing is different from illusionism, and is more like the one articulated by Dennett for most of his career. E.g., Dennett’s 1979 “On the absence of phenomenology”:
Or his 1991 Consciousness Explained:
Indeed, Dennett describes non-physicalism as being based on a “hunch”, as though it were just a nagging hard-to-pin-down belief and not something that feels palpably present in all experience. This seems very weird to me.
These days I believe Dennett endorses illusionism instead, though I’m not sure what changed his mind if so? And I have to wonder whether he has some aphantasia-like condition that made a view as weird as delusionism appealing.
If you say so, but it doesn’t make it any easier to believe!
It’s not clear that it’s a hunch , and it’s not clear that it’s a palpable presence. Physics is a complicated subject that most people do not understand , so why would anyone have reliable hunches or introspections about non physicallity? And the phenomenology varies anyway...some people, but nobody here, have the intuition that thought is non physical.
Dennetts phenomenonology is a mystery. Maybe it’s like one of those early computer games that prints out “you see a fire breathing dragon”.