Yes, functionalism has never had a well-defined boundary about which processes instantiate which computations, let alone which processes instantiate which conscious beings. I suspect it may be the concept of “instantiation” that’s at fault—since it implies that there is an instantiated thing separate from that which instantiates it. Anytime you start looking for things that resemble bridging laws, you should suspect that you’re on a zombie track. What you need are identity laws.
But, Mitchell, you end up with exactly the same questions when you consider an Ebborian with a splitting brain. You say that a definite fact should exist as to how many people there are. But it wouldn’t seem terribly impossible to construct an Ebborian in real life—in which case the Ebborian is definitely, visibly splitting.
So either it’s your job to say definitely when one person becomes two—or you have to deny that the Ebborian could be conscious without new physics that would themselves settle the issue.
So, Mitchell, would you agree with the following statements?
1) “All criticisms that I have of MWI apply equally to any functionalist theory of consciousness.”
2) “All criticisms that I have of MWI apply equally to any computable theory of physics.”
3) “All criticisms that I have of MWI apply equally to any Copenhagen interpretation in which the collapse process is purely random and there are no new physics supporting consciousness beyond what is in the Standard Model.”
Yes, functionalism has never had a well-defined boundary about which processes instantiate which computations, let alone which processes instantiate which conscious beings. I suspect it may be the concept of “instantiation” that’s at fault—since it implies that there is an instantiated thing separate from that which instantiates it. Anytime you start looking for things that resemble bridging laws, you should suspect that you’re on a zombie track. What you need are identity laws.
But, Mitchell, you end up with exactly the same questions when you consider an Ebborian with a splitting brain. You say that a definite fact should exist as to how many people there are. But it wouldn’t seem terribly impossible to construct an Ebborian in real life—in which case the Ebborian is definitely, visibly splitting.
So either it’s your job to say definitely when one person becomes two—or you have to deny that the Ebborian could be conscious without new physics that would themselves settle the issue.
So, Mitchell, would you agree with the following statements?
1) “All criticisms that I have of MWI apply equally to any functionalist theory of consciousness.”
2) “All criticisms that I have of MWI apply equally to any computable theory of physics.”
3) “All criticisms that I have of MWI apply equally to any Copenhagen interpretation in which the collapse process is purely random and there are no new physics supporting consciousness beyond what is in the Standard Model.”