Given the disagreement over what “causality” is, I suspect that different CDT’s might have different tolerances for adding precommitment without spoiling the point of CDT. For an example of a definition of causality that makes interesting impacts on decision theory, see Douglas Kutach, Causation and its Basis in Fundamental Physics. There’s a nice review here. Defining “causation” Kutach’s way would allow both making and keeping precommitments to count as causing good results. It would also at least partly collapse the divergence between CDT and EDT. Maybe completely—I haven’t thought that through yet.
Given the disagreement over what “causality” is, I suspect that different CDT’s might have different tolerances for adding precommitment without spoiling the point of CDT. For an example of a definition of causality that makes interesting impacts on decision theory, see Douglas Kutach, Causation and its Basis in Fundamental Physics. There’s a nice review here. Defining “causation” Kutach’s way would allow both making and keeping precommitments to count as causing good results. It would also at least partly collapse the divergence between CDT and EDT. Maybe completely—I haven’t thought that through yet.